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A  R E L A T I O N A L  F E M I N I S T  A P P R O A C H  T O
C O N F L I C T  O F  L A W S
oxana anu*
Feminist writers have long engaged in critiques of private law.
Surrogacy contracts or the “reasonable man” standard in torts, for
example, have long been the subjects of thorough feminist analysis
and critique. When private law issues touch on more than one juris-
diction, Conflict of Laws is the doctrine that determines which juris-
diction can try the case and—as separate questions—which
jurisdiction’s law should apply and under what conditions a foreign
judgment can be recognized and enforced. Yet, there are virtually no
feminist perspectives on Conflict of Laws (also known as Private In-
ternational Law). This is still more surprising when one considers
that feminist approaches to Public International Law have been de-
veloping for over a quarter century.
In this Article, I show that there is a fundamental need to
rethink the image of the transnational individual in Conflict of
Laws theory and methodology. It is here, I argue, that feminism—
specifically relational, often known as cultural, feminism—has an
important contribution to make to Conflict of Laws. I develop a
relational feminist approach to Conflict of Laws and apply it to a
pressing contemporary issue, namely transnational surrogacy
arrangements.
Overall, this Article shows how relational feminism can illu-
minate the problems of adopting an atomistic image of the individ-
ual in a transnational context, as well as provide an outline for an
alternative—a relational theory of the self that redefines autonomy
and the law, creating an important shift in how Conflict of Laws
perceives its regulatory dimensions. The Article connects three of re-
lational feminism’s core insights—the notion of relational auton-
omy, the focus on relationships, and relational theories of judging—
to Conflict of Laws theory and methodology.
* Visiting Research Fellow, Fordham Law School; SJD, University of Toronto, Faculty
of Law. For an earlier conversation about relational feminism, which inspired this
article, I am very grateful to Jennifer Nedelsky. For useful comments and suggestions
on an earlier draft, I am thankful to Karen Knop, Joanna Langille, and the
participants in the workshop on relational autonomy, held at the University of
Toronto in January 2017. For referring me to the various European Court of Human
Rights decisions on surrogacy matters, I am very grateful to Stéphanie Francq.
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Feminists, as Robin West noted, seek both to “deconstruct so as to
expose the hidden politics of dominant conceptions of justice” and to “con-
struct or re-imagine alternatives with care.”1 Feminist writers have recon-
structed and reimagined key issues and areas of law, as well as the key
jurisprudential categories underlying them, including rights,2 contractual
freedom,3 autonomy,4 the social contract metaphor,5 and many other con-
cepts of traditional legal and political theory. Feminist approaches have long
1. Robin West, Re-Imagining Justice, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 333, 344 (2002).
2. See, e.g., Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights as Relationship, 1 REV. CONST. STUD.
1 (1993).
3. Robin West, The Right to Contract as a Civil Right, 26 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 551
(2014).
4. Christine Di Stefano, Autonomy in the Light of Difference, in REVISIONING THE PO-
LITICAL: FEMINIST RECONSTRUCTIONS OF TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS IN WESTERN
POLITICAL THEORY 95 (Nancy J. Hirschmann & Christine Di Stefano eds., 1996).
5. See Jean Hampton, Feminist Contractarianism, in VARIETIES OF FEMINIST LIBER-
ALISM 159 (Amy Baehr ed., 2004).
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been applied in the analysis of national private law—family law,6 contract
law,7 and tort law.8 In international law, feminist approaches have devel-
oped more slowly.9 This may be because concerns for equality and empow-
erment do not map cleanly onto the classical inter-sovereign framework of
Public International Law. Nonetheless, some success has been achieved in
developing a feminist approach to international law.10
Between national and international law, public and private law, Con-
flict of Laws (also known as Private International Law) has a remarkable
impact on the regulation of interpersonal relationships in the transnational
realm. Yet it has remained insulated from the astute lens of feminist juris-
prudence. Although the issues are similar to those in the purely domestic
setting, and although feminist approaches have existed in Public Interna-
tional Law for a quarter century, feminist approaches to Conflict of Laws
are virtually nonexistent.11
6. E.g., Katharine Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 476 (1999); FEMI-
NIST PERSPECTIVES ON FAMILY LAW (Alison Diduck & Katherine O’Donovan eds.,
1st ed. 2007).
7. See, e.g., Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE
L.J. 997 (1985); Mary Joe Frug, Re-reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Con-
tracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065 (1985); Debora L. Threedy, Feminists &
Contract Doctrine, 32 IND. L. REV. 1247 (1999).
8. E.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3 (1988); Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women’s Issues
in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41 (1989); Carl Tobias, Gender Issues and
the Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz Torts Casebook, 18 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 495
(1988).
9. See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright eds., Feminist
Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 613, 614 (1991).
10. Feminist writers are particularly interested in the application of egalitarian principles
of justice in the private realm and are avid critics of the private/public dichotomy.
See, e.g., Carol Paterman, Feminist Critiques of the Private/Public Dichotomy, in PUB-
LIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 281 (S.I. Benn & G.F. Gaus eds., 1983).
11. Notable exceptions are Ivana Isailovic, Political Recognition and Transnational Law,
Gender Equality and Cultural Diversification in French Courts, in PRIVATE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 318 (Horatia Muir Watt & Diego P. Fer-
nández Arroyo eds., 2015); Karen Knop, Relational Nationality: On Gender and
Nationality in International Law, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES
AND PRACTICES 89 (T.A. Aleinikoff & D. Klusmeyer eds., 2001); Horatia Muir
Watt, Future Directions?, in PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERN-
ANCE 343 (Horatia Muir Watt & Diego P. Fernández Arroyo eds., 2015) (recovering
a framework of recognition inspired, among others, by feminist writings); Annalise
Acorn, Gender Discrimination in the Common Law of Domicile and the Application of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 29 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 419 (1991)
(regarding dependent domicile); Karen Knop & Christine Chinkin, Remembering
Chrystal MacMillan: Women’s Equality and Nationality in International Law, 22
MICH. J. INT’L L. 523 (2001) (regarding dependent nationality).
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This Article aims to create an initial bridge between feminism, espe-
cially relational feminism,12 and Conflict of Laws by showing the ways in
which relational feminism can reform Conflict of Laws and center it on a
relational image of the individual in the transnational realm.
A bewildering variety of interpersonal relationships with a foreign ele-
ment fall under the regulatory scope of Conflict of Laws, such that a large
part of our transnational existence is impacted by Conflict of Laws norms.
Conflict of Laws determines which law (not necessarily that of the forum)
should apply to an interpersonal relationship touching upon different legal
systems (e.g. cross-border contracts, transnational adoptions, family rela-
tions between individuals of different citizenship or domiciled in different
jurisdictions, transnational torts, etc.), which court has jurisdiction to hear
such disputes, and whether or not a judgment rendered in a transnational
legal matter can be recognized abroad. Viewing a Conflict of Laws issue
through the lens of feminist theory exposes the imbalance of power and
wealth and the variety of oppressive relationships for people, especially
women, in the transnational realm.
Feminist theory, particularly the relational variation I discuss in this
Article, not only centers the analysis on gender hierarchies but also “envis-
ages authority from within structures of power and authority” and is “sensi-
tive to structural inequities in the position of differently situated women
and members of social groups whose opportunity to shape their lives in self-
determining directions are often meager and inadequate.”13 Critics claim
that current Conflict of Laws norms have directly contributed to systemic
inequality and injustice on a global level.14 Feminist jurisprudence would
12. Relational feminism represents one of several feminist perspectives. For a good intro-
duction to relational feminism, see Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality, Towards a
Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 21 (1999). For an overview of differ-
ent feminist perspectives, see Laws Lacey, Feminist Legal Theory and the Rights of
Women, in GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS 13 (Karen Knop ed., 2004).
13. Anne Donchin, Autonomy and Interdependence: Quandaries in Genetic Decision Mak-
ing, in RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY,
AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF 236, 240 (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar
eds., 2000) [hereinafter RELATIONAL AUTONOMY].
14. See, e.g., Horatia Muir Watt, Introduction, in PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1, 1 (Horatia Muir Watt & Diego P. Fernández Arroyo eds.,
2015):
Despite the contemporary juridification of international politics, private in-
ternational law has contributed very little to the global governance debate,
remaining remarkably silent before the increasingly unequal distribution of
wealth and authority in the world. Under the aegis of the liberal divides
between law and politics and between the public and the private spheres, it
has developed a form of epistemological tunnel-vision actively providing
immunity and impunity to abusers of private sovereignty.
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therefore be ideally suited to redevelop Conflict of Laws theory and meth-
odology in a way that would allow it to address, rather than perpetuate,
global inequality and injustice.
This position is in tension with a growing movement to focus on the
state rather than on the individual. Contemporary critics of Conflict of
Laws interested in its potential as a form of global governance15 find that
individual autonomy is unchecked in Conflict of Laws and that this is due
to the field’s individualism as a form of private law.16 This prompts them to
advocate focusing on states rather than individuals. Critics also take aim at
Conflict of Laws’ “neutral” and apolitical stance, which is supposedly the
result of Conflict of Laws’ liberalism and insulates the field from the sys-
temic, global implications of the world’s current injustices and abuses
brought or sustained by the operation of its norms.17 Since Conflict of
Laws’ problem is thought to be its individualism, it is no surprise that many
global governance projects in Conflict of Laws recommend focusing on the
state, incorporating regulatory policies, and reconnecting Private to Public
15. See, e.g., Private International Law as Global Governance (PILAGG), http://
blogs.sciences-po.fr/pilagg/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2017) (a program based at the Sci-
ences Po Law School and co-directed by Horatia Muir Watt and Diego P. Fernández
Arroyo). For different perspectives on how to think about and incorporate a global
governance dimension in private international law, see Jacco Bomhoff, The Constitu-
tion of the Conflict of Laws, in PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL GOV-
ERNANCE 262, 263 (Horatia Muir Watt & Diego P. Fernández Arroyo eds., 2015);
ALEX MILLS, THE CONFLUENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW:
JUSTICE, PLURALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDERING OF PRIVATE LAW (2009); Horatia Muir Watt, Private International Law
Beyond the Schism, 2 TRANSNAT’L L. THEORY 347, 350 (2011).
16. See, e.g., Bomhoff, supra note 15, at 262 (“the appeal to constitutionalist ideas pur-
sued in this chapter is one attempt to restoratively invoke some form of ‘the public’
in the face of increasing threats of private hegemony”). See also Muir Watt, supra
note 15, at 387:
[T]he liberal paradigm favors an approach to legal problems in terms of the
‘micro’ or the individual—individual civil or political rights; private prop-
erty; discrete contracts; non-mass torts. In addition, ‘private’ law adopts a
backward-looking perspective, providing the tools for solving inter-subjec-
tive conflicts ex post, on a case-by-case basis. Issues relating to collective
goods often tend to be confiscated or occulted by private conflicts. Private
international law has internalized these limitations and disconnected from
the macro-perspective which focuses on the surrounding social and political
context.
17. See, e.g., Muir Watt, supra note 15, at 360, n. 62 (“The supposed ‘naturality’ of the
principles of private international law owes an initial debt to Von Savigny’s great
Treatise of Roman Law System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, 1849, whose famous
chapter VIII is believed to be the fount of modern conflicts methodology”).
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International Law.18 Issues of Conflict of Laws, according to its critics,
should be understood as conflicts of state authority, state interests, state
sovereignty, or state resources, rather than conflicts of individuals’ rights,
interests, or reasonable expectations.19 Yet this call to move away from an
individual-centered perspective is in tension with claims that Conflict of
Laws fails to recognize relationships that are vital for individuals’ dignity,
security, autonomy, and sense of self-worth.20 Even critics pleading for a
state-centric vision of Conflict of Laws understand the dangers of excluding
the agency and autonomy of individuals.
In other words, there is a tension within critical projects in Conflict of
Laws. On the one hand, these projects underscore a real and significant
threat of abuses of private power and illuminate the injustice and stark eco-
nomic and social disparities that an individualistic outlook in Conflict of
Laws may generate.21 On the other hand, these works draw attention to the
dangers of eliminating individuals’ space for contestation, and pleas for jus-
tice, recognition, and inclusion.22
18. See, e.g., Bomhoff, supra note 15, at 263 (arguing for a shift from the private to a
public paradigm); Muir Watt, supra note 15, at 350 (arguing for a move from the
private law paradigm in Conflict of Laws to a connection with the politics of Public
International Law); MILLS, supra note 15 (arguing for a reconnection between Con-
flict of Laws and Public International Law and a departure from the framework of
justice in the individual case based in part on individuals’ reasonable expectations).
19. For an examination of different state-centric, as opposed to individual-centered per-
spectives, see infra Section I.A.
20. Horatia Muir Watt, Future Directions?, in PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 343, 367 (Horatia Muir Watt & Diego P. Fernández Arroyo
eds., 2014).
21. The scholarship of contemporary European scholars focusing on Conflict of Laws’
global governance function thus intersects with similar arguments made by American
realist scholars in Conflict of Laws between 1930 and 1960. See supra notes 15–16
and accompanying text. See DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW: SELECTED
ESSAYS, 1933–1983  (1985); BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CON-
FLICT OF LAWS (1963); Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the
Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457 (1924); Walter Wheeler Cook, The Jurisdiction of
Sovereign States and the Conflict of Laws, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 368 (1931); Ernest
Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736
(1923).
22. See Ralf Michaels, Economics of Law as Choice of Law, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
73, 100 (2008) [hereinafter Michaels, Economics of Law]:
[The international law model] views choice of law as a mere subset of inter-
national law, and questions of the conflict between laws are not essentially
different from conflicts between different policies more generally. . . . The
vertical scope of state power over individuals is ignored. In an international-
law model in which states are viewed as unitary actors, the problem of
inefficient domestic rules cannot exist because those disadvantaged by such
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It is no surprise then that on both sides of the Atlantic neither individ-
ualistic nor state-centric projects have been entirely satisfactory. Instead, the
projects constantly operate in tension with each other, simultaneously chal-
lenging one another and borrowing from each other’s insights.23
I suggest that, once acknowledged, this tension should not translate
into the familiar and constant pendulum between state-centric and individ-
ualistic perspectives in Conflict of Laws. Rather, what is needed is a rethink-
ing of the image of the transnational individual in Conflict of Laws theory
and methodology.  It is here that feminism—specifically relational femi-
nism, also known as cultural feminism24—can contribute to a rethinking of
Conflict of Laws. This article shows that relational feminism illuminates the
norms, private parties, are simply absent from the analysis, or rather, their
interests are subsumed into those of states.
For European projects drawing attention to the dangers of eliminating individual
agency, see AXEL FLESSNER, INTERESSENJURISPRUDENZ IM INTERNATIONALEN
PRIVATRECHT (1990); Gerhard Kegel, Begriffs- und Interessenjurisprudenz im interna-
tionalen Privatrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT HANS LEWALD: BEI VOLLENDUNG DES 40.
AMTSJAHRES ALS ORDENTLICHER PROFESSOR IM OKTOBER 1953 ÜBERREICHT VON
SEINEN FREUNDEN UND KOLLEGEN MIT UNTERSTÜTZUNG DER BASLER JURISTIS-
CHEN FAKULTÄT (Hans Lewald ed., 1953); Alexander Lüderitz, Anknüpfung im
Parteiinteresse, in INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT UND RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG IM
AUSGANG DES 20. JAHRHUNDERTS: BEWAHRUNG ODER WENDE? FESTSCHRIFT FÜR
GERHARD KEGEL 31 (Alexander Lüderitz & Jochen Schröder eds., 1977). Various
American scholars also challenged the state-centric ideology of Brainard Currie and
attempted to introduce a stronger focus on individual agency and autonomy. See,
e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277 (1989);
Perry Dane, Vested Rights, “Vestedness,” and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191 (1987);
Terry S. Kogan, Toward a Jurisprudence of Choice of Law: The Priority of Fairness over
Comity, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651 (1987).
23. For an argument that neither perspective, in isolation, is satisfactory for Conflict of
Laws theory, see Economics of Law, supra note 22 at 102; Andreas Bucher, La dimen-
sion sociale du droit international privé: cours general, 330 RECUEIL DES COURS DE
L’ACADÉMIE DE LA HAYE EN LIGNE 1, 99 (2009) (available at http://dx.doi.org/
10.1163/1875-8096_pplrdc_ej.9789004185098.009_526); Spyridon Vrellis, Conflit
ou coordination de valeurs en droit international privé a la recherché de la justice, 328
RECUEIL DES COURS DE L’ACADÉMIE DE LA HAYE EN LIGNE 189, 196 (2007) (avail-
able at http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758096_pplrdc_ej.9789004172890.175_486).
24. For a general outlook on cultural feminism within feminist legal theory, see Kathe-
rine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 872–77 (1990);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mainstreaming Feminist Legal Theory, 23 PAC. L.J. 1493,
1499–1501 (1992). Some representative perspectives of cultural—also known as
“hedonic”—feminism are Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality, Towards a Substan-
tive Feminism, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 21 (1999) (coining the phrase “relational
feminism”); Robin L. West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomeno-
logical Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 81 (1987). For a
more expanded understanding of relational feminism, see Symposium, Feminist The-
ories of Relation in the Shadow of the Law, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (2002).
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issues posed by adopting an atomistic image of the individual in a transna-
tional context and provides an alternative theory of the self, autonomy, and
law.
Furthermore, relational feminism provides Conflict of Laws with a
language to critique individualism that is itself individual-centered. As I ex-
plain in the following pages, relational feminists, unlike Conflict of Laws
critics of individualism, are equally skeptical of state-centric or communitar-
ian theories that uncritically subsume the individual under the state or the
nation, and under state interests and collective preferences. Relational femi-
nists’ critique of individualism, unlike that of Conflict of Laws scholars, is
not premised on the authority of the community over the individual by
virtue of her belonging to such community, but rather on a rich and con-
textual description of human nature. The individual is—according to rela-
tional feminists—inherently social and constituted by the web of
relationships in which she is embedded at different points in her life. By
revealing and critically assessing this relational web in the transnational con-
text, relational feminism enriches Conflict of Laws doctrine.
In the first section of this Article, I take stock of Conflict of Laws’
individualistic and state-centric imaginaries. I show the way in which Con-
flict of Laws adopts the image of the isolated atomistic transnational agent
in its theories of fairness, consent, and impartiality, as well as its notions of
vested rights and formal autonomy. I then reveal two state-centric biases
underlying Conflict of Laws theories that project transnational legal matters
either as conflicts of sovereignty or of state interests.
This sets the stage for the connection that I forge between relational
feminism and Conflict of Laws in the second part of the Article. My goal is
to illuminate how core insights of relational feminism help to articulate
some of Conflict of Laws’ inherent tensions and “formulate a language” that
centers Conflict of Laws theory and methodology on relational beings and
autonomy.25
To reveal how relational feminism could instruct the field of Conflict
of Laws, I focus on three of relational feminism’s core insights: its notion of
relational autonomy which generates skepticism towards both individualis-
tic and state-centric perspectives (II.A); its focus on networks of relation-
ships, while emphasizing both their virtue and their perils (II.B); and the
25. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF THE SELF, AU-
TONOMY AND LAW 10 (2011) (“My hoped-for audience also includes those who
have long seen things in relational terms but have not yet found an adequate lan-
guage for articulating this perspective. One of the purposes of political theory, in my
mind, is to help people formulate a language for how they see the world. When
people’s frameworks do not fit with the dominant one, they can be rendered inartic-
ulate.”) [hereinafter NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS].
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way in which relational feminism links a fluid relational analysis and meth-
odology with judicial self-consciousness (II.C). I show how these analytical
moves challenge both the individualistic and state-centric imaginaries of
Conflict of Laws to project an entirely different analysis of Conflict of Laws
matters centered on the patterns of relationships that Conflict of Laws
norms structure in the transnational realm.
Throughout this Article, I outline the different lessons Conflict of
Laws could learn from relational feminism by reference to international sur-
rogacy arrangements. Surrogacy agreements arise between a woman who
agrees to carry a baby (with the understanding that she will not keep him/
her) and the intended parents of the baby.26 The transnational nature of this
agreement usually arises when, due to legal restrictions in the state of domi-
cile/citizenship, the intended parents enter into an agreement with a woman
of different citizenship and/or domicile. Often, either one or both of the
intended parents will send their genetic material to the place of domicile of
the surrogate mother or will travel to give such genetic material.27 After the
birth of the baby, the intended parents usually request, from the consulate
of their country at the place of the child’s birth, a travel document allowing
them to bring the child into the intended parents’ country and to register
him/her as their child. Either at that stage or upon the child entering the
country of the intended parents, authorities in countries that disallow do-
mestic surrogacy agreements must decide whether to recognize the transna-
tional surrogacy.
Conflict of Laws continues to struggle with the proper way of concep-
tualizing and analyzing such transnational legal matters. It also struggles to
capture the diverse and interlocking interests involved in such matters. My
goal is to show how a relational feminist analysis helps expose and
problematize those interests, as well as the transnational regulatory model to
which it might point. I therefore map the three core insights of relational
feminism mentioned above onto three central Conflict of Laws issues in-
volved in the analysis of transnational surrogacy arrangements.
First, Conflict of Laws often constructs and struggles to reconcile a
perceived tension between autonomy and public policy. For transnational
26. E.g., In re Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (N.J. 1988).
27. There are two types of surrogacy: traditional and gestational surrogacy. In traditional
surrogacy cases, the surrogate mother becomes pregnant with the sperm of the in-
tended father or is inseminated with donor sperm. In gestational surrogacy, an em-
bryo is created by IVF, using the egg of the intended mother (or a donor egg) and
the sperm of the intended father (or a donor sperm). For a description of different
types of surrogacy, see General Report on Surrogacy, in INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY
ARRANGEMENTS: LEGAL REGULATION AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 440 (Kata-
rina Trimmings & Paul Beaumont eds., 2013).
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surrogacy arrangements this translates into a tension between a state’s policy
to disallow surrogacy arrangements and the autonomy of the parties to enter
into such an agreement and/or choose a law that validates such agreement.
Relational perspectives on autonomy challenge and reconstruct this tension
by offering a perspective on autonomy that differs from the classical market-
based view.
Second, Conflict of Laws struggles to find adequate ways to resolve
clashes between national and international policy, often involving human
rights norms. In transnational surrogacy arrangements, conflicts between a
state policy of disallowing such arrangements and the human rights of the
child, or between a national policy of allowing such arrangements and the
human rights of the surrogate mother seem to stymy much of the Conflict
of Laws reasoning. Relational theories of judging illuminate important ways
of referencing and balancing various community values.
Third, Conflict of Laws struggles with characterizing transnational
surrogacy arrangements, which involve, for example, questions of filiation,
contracts, and adoption. Relational feminism would provide a more
nuanced perspective on the issue of characterization in Conflict of Laws. It
instructs decision makers in Conflict of Laws to choose the legal category
based on the particular kind of relationship it would structure between indi-
viduals in the transnational realm given the difference in the substance of
the laws in conflict.
Transnational surrogacy arrangements represent a fruitful place of in-
spiration from relational feminism for Conflict of Laws. However, the value
of relational feminism for Conflict of Laws is not limited to family and
identity issues. Therefore, this Article concludes by briefly referencing ways
in which relational feminist approaches in Conflict of Laws are equally valu-
able for transnational matters involving complex economic considerations,
such as transnational torts of multinational corporations.
I. CONFLICT OF LAWS IMAGINARIES
A. State-Centric Imaginaries
Because a Conflict of Laws case involves not only individuals, but also
their states, some scholars tend to see the issue as a continuation of private
law and thus a matter between two individuals, while others see the conflict
as between the different states whose laws are implicated in the legal issue.28
For example, the question is often asked whether the recognition of interna-
tional surrogacy arrangements is premised on international comity among
28. For a description of such perspectives in classical Conflict of Laws theories and in
recent economic theories in Conflict of Laws, see Economics of Law, supra note 22.
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states29 or on parties’ autonomy via consent to the agreement or the choice
of law validating such agreement.30
As Ralf Michaels pointed out, Conflict of Laws continuously struggles
with such questions as:
Is choice of law about conflicts between states and their desires
to regulate? (as the governmental-interest analysis dictates it?) Or
is it about conflicts between private rights acquired in one state
and public regulation in another (as in vested-rights theory)? Or
is it not about conflicts at all, but merely about the technical
designation of the applicable law?31
Conflict of Laws hosts a state-centric bias that is rarely critically ex-
amined. In light of recent fears of individualistic autonomy, Conflict of
Laws’ own state-centrism has been even less questioned and rethought. Yet
at least two prominent traditions show the entrenched state-centric direc-
tions of Conflict of Laws.
A first variation of state-centrism is seen in the nineteenth century
association between Conflict of Laws and Public International Law, which
combined the imagery of Conflict of Laws with Public International Law’s
division of sovereignty.32 Conflict of Laws matters became inquiries into the
limits of “personal” or “territorial” sovereignty in broad categories of Con-
flict of Laws relations. The “state-centric ethic” Conflict of Laws acquired
through its association with Public International Law33 advanced the pro-
position that it is “entirely wrong to assume that the individual has a right
to the application of a certain law, because the limits of the authority of law
29. See Steven H. Snyder, United States of America, in INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY AR-
RANGEMENTS: LEGAL REGULATION AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 387, 387 (Kata-
rina Trimmings & Paul Beaumont eds., 2013).
30. See Mary Keyes, Cross-Border Surrogacy Arrangements, 26 AUSTL. J. FAM. L.  28
(2012) for such a perspective in Australian decisions on international surrogacy
arrangements.
31. Michaels, Economics of Law, supra note 22, at 78.
32. For a general discussion of the nineteenth century internationalist school of thought
focused on state sovereignty, see André Bonnichon, La notion de conflit de souver-
ainetés dans la science du conflits de lois, pt. 1, 39 REV. CRIT. DR. INT. PRIVÉ 615
(1949) [hereinafter Bonnichon, Pt.1]; André Bonnichon, La notion de conflit de
souverainetés dans la science du conflits de lois, pt. 2, 40 REV. CRIT. DR. INT. PRIVÉ 11
(1950) [hereinafter Bonnichon, Pt.2].
33. For the proposition that Conflict of Laws should move past the state-centric ethic
borrowed from Public International Law, see H. Patrick Glenn, The Ethic of Interna-
tional Law, in THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Donald Earl Chil-
dress ed., 2012).
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are not fixed by consideration to private interests but result from the limits
of the public powers which enacted them.”34
The Conflict of Laws determination was imagined in these terms:
“The litigating parties disappear for a while: instead there are only two sov-
ereigns in attendance and their respective rights and obligations can only be
determined by Public International Law.”35 For a representative number of
nineteenth century Conflict of Laws scholars, it was clear that “we are not
dealing with individuals, but with states,”36 and that Conflict of Laws, as
doctrine, was limited to settling relationships between states and establish-
ing the limits of their respective legislative competence with respect to rights
and private interests.37 In its more extreme variations, the state-centric per-
spective made it almost impossible to account for the agency of the litigat-
ing parties. Their appeals to the application of a particular law had to be
made “in the name of a sovereign.”38 In the nineteenth century, Mailhé de
Chasset argued that when a court is asked to recognize the application of
foreign law and rights granted by such law, the request does not come from
“a person, a simple individual,” but rather “a foreign sovereign,” and failure
to apply this law would result in “an infringement of the public law of the
foreign sovereign.”39
Although this state-centric paradigm structured around a universal
distribution of state sovereignty is not as explicitly articulated now as in the
quotes above, it is no nineteenth century relic. In 1950, it was still perceived
as the dominant theory of Conflict of Laws, at least in civil law jurisdic-
tions.40 Recently, it has been revived in projects aiming to reconnect Private
to Public International Law.41 Furthermore, as I show in another Article,
courts often decide cross-border transnational tort matters in a way that
resembles nineteenth century state-centric theories focused on a formalist
34. Antoine Pillet, Droit international privé consideré dans ses rapports avec le droit interna-
tional public [Private international law considered in its relations with public interna-




37. See ANTOINE PILLET, PRINCIPES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 56 (1903) (con-
necting Conflict of Laws with Public International Law and conceptualizing Conflict
of Laws matters as conflicts of state sovereignty).
38. Mailhé de Chassat, Traité de statuts (lois personelles, lois réelles), d’après le droit ancienes
et le droit modern, in DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ [D.I.P.] 214 (1845).
39. Id.
40. Bonnichon, Pt. 1, supra note 32, at 615.
41. See MILLS, supra note 15.
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notion of state sovereignty.42 Under this paradigm, transnational torts of
multinational corporations are generally submitted to the law of the place of
tort on the assumption that this country should have the authority to regu-
late all torts in its territory. This solution appeals to the principles of neutral
distribution of authority. However, it ignores the stark imbalance of power
and resources between different states implicated in the international invest-
ment regime. It also ignores or excludes considerations of imbalance of
power between multinational corporations and the local population.
A second variation of the state-centric argument was articulated in the
United States in the nineteen-sixties by Brainerd Currie, who imagined
Conflict of Laws matters as conflicts of state interests.43 In his account,
judges should determine Conflict of Laws matters by discerning legal poli-
cies underlying potentially applicable laws and then distinguishing between
true conflicts (in which all states have an interest in regulating the matter),
false conflicts (in which only one state has an interest), and unprovided-for
cases (in which neither state has an interest).44 While Currie’s approach re-
placed nineteenth century formalism with a policy-oriented examination of
state interests, the “state-centric ethic” remained largely intact.45 While the
formalism that nineteenth century scholars attributed to state sovereignty
was replaced by a policy oriented examination of state interests, the “state-
centric ethic” had not changed much.46 The assumption was still that only
two sovereigns are in attendance in this struggle over divergent state inter-
ests and that the voice of the litigating parties or other affected individuals
and groups are comfortably reflected in the judges’ articulations of states’
policies deduced from statutory interpretation.47 Individuals’ agency in ar-
ticulating their appeals to justice through the application of one law or an-
other were explicitly excluded, since Conflict of Laws matters are perceived
42. Roxana Banu, Assuming Regulatory Authority for Transnational Torts: An Interstate
Affair? A Historical Perspective on the Canadian Private International Law Tort Rules,
31 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 197, 210–11 (2013).
43. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
44. Id. at 107, 119, 163, 189, 726.
45. Id. at 83, 86, 103, 141 n. 53, 292.
46. For two prominent critiques of the state-interest methodology and its state-centric
premises, see Brilmayer, supra note 22; Dane, supra note 22.
47. For an argument that state policies should be disaggregated to distinguish between
different interests (individual, group, and public), see Robert Kramer, Interests and
Policy Clashes in Conflict of Laws, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 523, 526 (1959) (arguing
that the task of state interest analysis should be “identifying and separating from each
other the various interests—individual, group, social” and understanding the way in
which the respective law is trying to reconcile “conflicts among or between the iden-
tified interests”).
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as clashes between the interests of the states, not the litigating parties.48 This
particular state-centric theory is not a relic of the sixties either. Rather, this
perspective has been recast in more recent theories focused on game-theoret-
ical models of maximizing state interests.49
B. Individualistic Imaginaries
State-centric imaginaries in Conflict of Laws have always been chal-
lenged by countervailing individualistic alternatives. Nineteenth century
formalist state-centric theories operated in tension with early nineteenth
century vested rights theories arguing that the existence of a right in the
transnational context is determined “not by submission under a law, but is a
direct consequence of autonomy. Foreign law is applied therefore simply
because this is what the parties want.”50 Whether a right is vested “does not
depend on a particular legal order, but on natural law and autonomy.”51 “If
a court applies forum law over the law desired by the individuals, it offends
not foreign law and the foreign state, but the individual and her rights
vested in accordance with party autonomy. It would falsify her will.”52
Under this perspective, in transnational tort matters it was thought that the
law of the place where the tortious act occurred would apply simply because
the tortfeasor manifested his/her will to act in that territory which in turn
creates a vested right to the application of such law.53
Today, variations of this theory focusing on individual autonomy and
choice are on the rise in Conflict of Laws.54 The notion that individuals
may simply choose the law applicable to their transnational relations, or that
48. For a critique along these lines see David Cavers, A Correspondence with Brainerd
Currie, 1957-1958, 34 MERCER L. REV. (SPECIAL CONTRIBUTION) 471, 485 (1982)
[hereinafter Cavers, A Correspondence].
49. Michaels, Economics of Law, supra note 22, at 83–84.
50. HORST MÜLLER, DER GRUNDSATZ DES WOHLERWORBENEN RECHTS IM INTERNA-
TIONALEN PRIVATRECHT 184 (1935), referencing Friedrich Wilhelm Tittmann, De
competentia legum externarum et domesticarum in defiendis potissimum iuribus coni-
ugum (1822).
51. Id. at 185.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 188.
54. See Ralf Michaels, Party Autonomy in Private International Law—A New Paradigm
Without a Solid Foundation?, 15 JAPANESE Y.B. INT’L L. 282, 282 (2013) (noting the
increasing importance attributed to party autonomy in Conflict of Laws and con-
testing its traces to the main Conflict of Laws theories) [hereinafter Michaels, Party
Autonomy]; Sagi Peari, Savigny’s Theory of Choice-of-Law as a Principle of ‘Voluntary
Submission’, 64 U. TORONTO L.J. 106, 106 (2014) (for a Kantian reading of Savi-
gny’s Conflict of Laws theory as premised on freedom of choice); Horatia Muir
Watt, “Party Autonomy” in International Contracts: From the Makings of a Myth to the
Requirements of Global Governance, 6 EUR. REV. CONTRACT L. 250, 250 (2010)
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such choice can be deduced from their actions, is a common slogan in Con-
flict of Laws theory.55 Prominent contemporary economic theories of Con-
flict of Laws focus on party autonomy and the alleged efficiency of
premising Conflict of Laws on an express or implied choice of law by the
parties.56
To counter Brainard Currie’s theory, which focused on regulatory pol-
icies and state interests, scholars have referenced the Rawlsian division be-
tween justice and fairness,57 the Dworkinian metaphor of rights as trumps,58
and the notion of formal equality.59 Terry Kogan, for example, explained
that “[f]airness contacts are unrelated to state interests or regulatory poli-
cies,”60 and Lea Brilmayer argued that a Conflict of Laws “[r]ights analysis
only establishes what Robert Nozick has called ‘side constraints,’ namely
principled limits, based on fairness, on what the state may do.”61 Therefore,
determinations of which law to apply in a transnational legal matter should
not be based on appreciations of different regulatory policies under different
laws, but rather on formal bases of legitimate authority. In Brilmayer’s ac-
count, for example, a state may only impose its authority on its domiciliar-
ies and not on foreigners, even if their conduct may affect domiciliaries or
the local economy.62  Notions of political legitimacy grounded in the social
contract, therefore, should serve as trumps to the authority of a state in
transnational legal matters.63
II. THE PROMISE OF A RELATIONAL FEMINIST ANALYSIS FOR
CONFLICT OF LAWS
In 2008, Ralf Michaels tested—and contested—the value of economic
theories of Conflict of Laws, which are now prominent in the United
(criticizing the increasing tendency to accredit freedom of choice as the foundational
principle in Conflict of Laws).
55. Michaels, Party Autonomy, supra note 54, at 282.
56. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. WHINCOP & MARY KEYES, POLICY AND PRAGMATISM IN THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 12–13, 29 (2001); Erin O’Hara & Larry Ripstein, From Politics
to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1186–87 (2000); Gisela
Rühl, Methods and Approaches in Choice of Law: An Economic Perspective, 24 BERKLEY
J. INT’L L. 801, 802 (2006).
57. Terry S. Kogan, Toward a Jurisprudence of Choice of Law: The Priority of Fairness over
Comity, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651 (1987).
58. See Brilmayer, supra note 22, at 1277.
59. Kogan, supra note 57, at 699 nn. 255 & 257.
60. Id. at 679.
61. Brilmayer, supra note 22, at 1279.
62. See id. at 1292–95.
63. See id. at 1279–80.
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States.64 He demonstrated that economic theories merely replicate, rather
than reconcile, the individual-centered/state-centered duality that underlies
classical Conflict of Laws theories. Thus, current economic theories of Con-
flict of Laws simply choose either an individual-centered or a state-centered
paradigm and provide “an economically substantiated answer to their cho-
sen question”65 but will neither justify their preference for one or the other
paradigm,66 nor engage with the critique against an absolute focus on party
autonomy or on public policy, on individualism or on communitarianism.67
In Michaels’s view, the failure of economic theories of Conflict of
Laws is what is most instructive about them. “The isolation of certain values
in the economic analysis, especially those of private and public ordering,
respectively, shows that it is the combination of, and the conflict between,
these values that defines the field [of Conflict of Laws].”68 But the failure is
nevertheless regrettable precisely because it is a combination of individual-
centered and state-centered perspectives that Conflict of Laws would need
most. In Michaels’s view, “[t]his is a combination that traditional doctrine
[of Conflict of Laws] has not yet addressed adequately and one in which
economics can make a true contribution.”69
In the following section, I argue that a relational feminist approach to
Conflict of Laws provides precisely such a combination of individual-cen-
tered and state-centered, private and public, perspectives. Relational femi-
nism has already articulated powerful critiques of both extreme positions in
various areas of domestic law and in Public International Law. Relational
feminism’s articulations of relational identity and autonomy, between the
individualistic and communitarian paradigms, inject a much-needed bal-
ance between individual-centered and state-centered considerations in Con-
flict of Laws theory and methodology.
64. See Michaels, Economics of Law, supra note 22.
65. Id. at 78.
66. See id. at 76, 78.
67. See id. at 75.
68. Id. at 76.
69. Id. at 102. I have argued at length that Conflict of Laws’ nineteenth century intellec-
tual history hosts a “relational internationalist” theoretical perspective that aims to
create a blend between individual-centered and state-centered perspectives. See Rox-
ana Banu, From Conflicts of Sovereignty to Relationships: Recovering Nineteenth
Century Relational Internationalist Perspectives in Private International Law (disser-
tation, defended June 2016 at the University of Toronto) (in contract with Oxford
University Press, forthcoming 2018 in the series THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW). I also argue that Conflict of Laws’ nineteenth century rela-
tional internationalist perspectives should be connected to contemporary relational
feminist theories (unpublished paper, awarded the American Society of International
Law for Best Text in Private International Law in 2016) (on file with author).
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A. Introducing Relational Feminism to Conflict of Laws
Relational feminism situates itself precisely at the juncture of the indi-
vidualistic and state-centric paradigms. At that intersection, neither the at-
omistic image of the individual, nor the idealization of community and of
the public interest is embraced as such. At the same time, neither image is
entirely refuted. As Jennifer Nedelsky explains:
Feminism appears equivocal in its stance toward liberalism be-
cause it simultaneously demands a respect for women’s individ-
ual selfhood and rejects the language and assumptions of
individual rights that have been our culture’s primary means of
expressing and enforcing respect for selfhood. This apparent
equivocation is not the result of superficiality or indecision. On
the contrary, it reflects the difficulties inherent in building a the-
ory (and practice) that adequately reflects both the social and the
individual nature of human beings.70
Relational feminism is premised on the centrality of relationships in
people’s lives. It pleads for the nurturing of relationships that are valuable
for people, as well as for legal and social intervention into relationships that
harm people. Relational feminism starts from a thorough reflection on
human nature, as well as the different ways in which women and men expe-
rience personhood, though insistence on one or the other often creates dif-
ferent visions of relational feminism. Relational feminism is sometimes
premised on the view of female identity, based on Carol Gilligan’s work,
that women tend to see themselves as linked to and even responsible for
many other individuals.71 As a result, their moral reasoning references an
70. Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 8 (1989) [hereinafter Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy].
71. Relational feminism has been criticized for essentializing women’s alleged different
voice across cultures and for underappreciating that the care paradigm, in large part,
has been attributed to women because of subordination under patriarchy, rather
than because of biological differences. See Martha Minow, Beyond Universality, 1989
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 115, (1989) (arguing against essentialism and for recognition of
differences even within the relational feminist paradigm); Feminist Discourse, Moral
Values, and the Law—A  Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11, 25–28 (1985) (Cathe-
rine McKinnon, in conversation with other feminist scholars, arguing that we cannot
attribute a genuine care voice to women under conditions of persistent subordina-
tion and patriarchy). Several feminist scholars have tried to argue for a less gender-
based care theory. See Annette C. Baier, Hume, The Woman’s Moral Theorist?, in
WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY 37 (Eva Kittay & Diane Meyers eds., 1987); Joan C.
Tronto, Beyond Gender Differences to a Theory of Care, 12 SIGNS 644, 644–45,
658–59 (1987). However, Leslie Bender has rejected a humanist, rather than femi-
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“ethic of care.” Alternatively, men tend to be motivated by an ethic of jus-
tice, premised on rights reasoning and a vision of self-made and self-suffi-
cient individuals.72 When linked to an ethic of care, relational feminism is
not just an analytical relational method that opens up the context under
legal analysis allowing for a wide range of possible outcomes. Rather, it also
becomes a plea for “increased valuation of caretaking, accommodation of
caretakers’ needs in employment settings, and breaking the link between sex
and gender roles.”73 Furthermore, in Robin West’s powerful articulations,
“the ethic of care embedded in the female labor of attending to intimate
relations is a principled moral stance . . . and therefore might express a
moral ‘point of view’ of importance in all areas of life, and not just the
familial.”74 West shows powerfully how resurfacing women’s distinctive sen-
sibilities of the ethic of care that have remained undervalued and even
nist, theory of care and has responded to many of the critiques brought against
relational feminism. Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Us-
ing Carol Gilligan and the Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REV. 1 (1990). As will
hopefully become apparent from the analysis in this Article, it is not necessary to
unequivocally attribute the paradigm of care only to women, or to consider this
paradigm universally valid, in order to highlight the contributions that relational
feminism could bring to Conflict of Laws. While I do not argue that the care theory
applied to Conflict of Laws needs to be exclusively associated with women’s exper-
iences, I do argue that the moral theory developed from the feminist theory of care,
focusing on increased empathy, responsibility, and care, should be applied to the
analysis of transnational legal matters.
72. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). For criticism of Gilligan’s work,
see MARILYN FRIEDMAN, WHAT ARE FRIENDS FOR: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND MORAL THEORY (1993); JEAN GRIMSHAW, PHILOS-
OPHY AND FEMINIST THINKING 190–94 (1986); Barbara Houston, RESCUING WO-
MANLY VIRTUES: SOME DANGERS OF MORAL RECLAMATION, in SCIENCE,
MORALITY & FEMINIST THEORY (Marsha Hanen & Kai Nielsen eds., 1987). See also
Nancy Chodorow’s psychoanalytic account of masculine and feminine psychic devel-
opment. NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1978).
73. Becker, supra note 12, at 45. See also Julie White & Joan Tronto, Political Practices of
Care: Needs and Rights, 17 RATIO JURIS 425, 449 (2004) (arguing for the recognition
of an entitlement to participate in relationships of care and receive adequate care, as
well as participate in the public process determining those entitlements). Prominent
care ethics theories include: VIRGINIA HELD, FEMINIST MORALITY (1993); EVA
FEDER KITTAY, LOVE’S LABOR, ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND DEPENDENCY
(1999); RITA C. MANNING, SPEAKING FROM THE HEART (1992); NEL NODDINGS,
CARING (1984); SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING (1989); JOAN TRONTO,
MORAL BOUNDARIES (1993).
74. ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 6 (1999) [hereinafter WEST, CARING FOR
JUSTICE].
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marginalized under patriarchy75 can also be extrapolated to help us “re-im-
agine” justice76 and create more solidarity and empathy.77
Further, relational feminism can be disconnected from cultural femi-
nism and the ethic of care, providing a more general analytical framework,
rather than a moral theory.78 Jennifer Nedelsky argues in Law’s Relations: A
Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law that “there is value to the
relational methodology as such”79 and that the relational approach extends
beyond personal relationships, to refer to structural and institutional rela-
tions,80 and even that this approach should be “methodologically available
to those whose relational stance is not primarily feminist.”81 In Nedelsky’s
account, the relational lens is not extracted from an appreciation of the
difference in women’s hedonic lives, “whether culturally induced, or shaped
by such physical experiences as pregnancy and nursing.”82 Rather, in her
view, “relationships are equally constitutive of males and females.”83 The
dual descriptive/prescriptive nature underlying Nedelsky’s relational femi-
nism therefore includes both an argument about how autonomy actually
works sociologically/psychologically84 and, on this basis, another argument
about what the law should promote/protect85 and how the law should
75. Id. at 9.
76. ROBIN WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF FORMAL
EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2003) [hereinafter WEST, RE-IMAGIN-
ING JUSTICE].
77. WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE, supra note 74, at 126.
78. For a very useful distinction between relational feminism as a method and relational
feminism as a feminist moral theory, see ROBERT LECKEY, CONTEXTUAL SUBJECTS:
FAMILY, STATE, AND RELATIONAL THEORY (2008). See also NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELA-
TIONS, supra note 25, at 87:
The ethic of care focuses on the particular rather than the abstract principle
and attends to context and to relationships in particular. Identifying this
form of moral reasoning—as genuine reasoning—was an important contri-
bution. And it is obvious why people would see similarities in our ap-
proach. However, I do not see my work as creating a moral theory, which is
the case for most theorists who work with the care framework. . . . [M]y
primary interest is the role of relationship, institutional as well as personal,
in enabling core values. Thus, relationship in my terms is not exclusively, or
even primarily, about personal relationship.
79. NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS, supra note 25, at 78.
80. Id. at 81.
81. Id. at 84.
82. Id. at 32.
83. Id. at 33.
84. Id. at 34–38 (discussing the truth claim behind human dependency and
relationality).
85. Id. at 70 (“law is currently structuring relations in ways that undermine women’s
equality, and a change in the law could structure more equal relations between men
and women”).
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conceive of rights.86 As a method, relationality “will clarify what is really at
stake” in every legal determination and “clarify the nature of the substantive
disagreement.”87 It expands and reveals the context in which legal claims are
articulated and adjudicated by exposing the web of nested relationships
which interact with each other and in which individuals are constantly em-
bedded.88 And while context in Nedelsky’s relational methodology includes
structural and institutional relations, it also moves beyond a pure contextual
analysis by “asking the question of how law structures relationships” and by
holding law and adjudicators accountable to the pattern of relationships
they construct.89
Regardless of whether Nedelsky is correct that many substantive com-
mitments of the care and cultural feminists will flow from the relational
method,90 I argue that Conflict of Laws would benefit not just from the
relational method itself, but also from engaging with the many premises of a
moral relational feminist theory. Incorporating the relational method into
Conflict of Laws would fundamentally shift Conflict of Laws’ framing of its
regulatory function from recognizing vested rights or states’ interests to con-
structing just patterns of interpersonal relationships in the transnational
realm. Furthermore, it would perceive litigating parties’ appeals to the appli-
cation of one or the other law as a means of recognizing, restructuring, or
transcending various types of relationships in the transnational realm—
whether personal, structural, or institutional. This means, finally, that self-
consciousness of one’s positionality,91 as well as empathy, would need to
inform judicial determinations in Conflict of Laws, rather than the usual
86. Id. at 74:
Rights structure relations of power, trust, responsibility, and care. This is as
true of property and contract rights as it is of rights created under family
law. All claims of rights involve interpretations and contestation. My argu-
ment is that these inevitable debates are best carried on in the following
relational terms. First, one should ask how existing laws and rights have
helped to construct the problem being addressed. What patterns and struc-
tures of relations have shaped it, and how has law helped shape those rela-
tions? The next questions are what values are at stake in the problem and
what kinds of relations enhance rather than undermine the values at stake.
87. Id. at 78.
88. Id. at 81.
89. Id. at 81.
90. Id. at 83 (explaining that the commitments of care “flow from the relational ap-
proach, though they are not my primary subject here”). For a broader explanation of
how feminist normative commitments relate to the relational method, see id. at
84–85.
91. For a definition of “positionality,” see infra note 176 and accompanying text.
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neutrality and deference to Conflict of Laws technicalities and “linguistic
parallels.”92
In addition, Conflict of Laws would benefit greatly from the more
substantive claims of relational feminism premised on the ethic of care. Re-
lationality should be more than a method for the field of Conflict of Laws.
Robin West’s call to extend an “intersubjective sensitivity to the needs of
others” such that various relationships—including those subject to Conflict
of Laws analysis, I argue—“can be infused, simply, with care,”93 would in-
ject a much-needed reflection on interpersonal responsibility in transna-
tional relations.94 And if the sympathetic engagement with the wellbeing of
others is extended to decision makers in Conflict of Laws—including
judges—then it becomes clear that judges should reassess what at first sight
appears as a clear individual choice or a clear public policy in the transna-
tional realm, in light of individuals’ actual lived and complicated exper-
iences.95 This will also inject moral responsibility into Conflict of Laws
decision-making that challenges the often-entrenched position that the
main concern of Conflict of Laws is to select the applicable law, rather than
consider the substantive outcome.96
B. Relational Autonomy and the Feminist Critique of Both Community and
the Atomistic Image of the Individual
At the heart of relational feminism is a project of reconstructing and
re-imagining the central concept of liberalism—autonomy.97 Relational
92. NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS, supra note 25, at 78–79.
93. WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE, supra note 74, at 278.
94. For an interesting feminist perspective on responsibility partly inspired by the ethic
of care, see Margaret Urban Walker, Picking up Pieces. Lives, Stories, and Integrity, in
FEMINISTS RETHINK THE SELF 62, 64 (Diana Tietjens Meyers ed., 1997) (“The basic
theme is that specific moral claims on us arise from our contact or relationship with
particular others whose interests are vulnerable to or dependent on our actions and
choices. We are obligated to respond to particular others when circumstances or ongo-
ing relationships render them especially, conspicuously, or peculiarly dependent on
us.”).
95. See generally Robin West, Taking Preferences Seriously, 64 TUL. L. REV. 659 (1990)
(arguing for judicial paternalism exemplified in a surrogacy case); Robin West, Com-
ment, Rationality, Hedonism, and the Case for Paternalistic Intervention, 3 LEGAL
THEORY 125 (1997) (arguing for paternalism).
96. WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE, supra note 76, at 27 (“Judicial abdication of respon-
sibility for the justice of ill consequences of a decision is never warranted, it is,
rather, an act of bad faith.”).
97. See Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy and Social Relationships, in FEMINISTS RETHINK
THE SELF 40 (Diana Tietjens Meyers ed., 1997) (“As an alternative, some feminists
in the 1980s began recommending a relational concept of autonomy, one that treats
social relationships and human community as central to the realization of autonomy.
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feminist perspectives share the conviction “that persons are socially embed-
ded and that agents’ identities are formed within the context of social rela-
tionships and shaped by a complex of intersecting social determinants, such
as race, class, gender, and ethnicity.”98 The focus of a relational approach is
“to analyze the implications of the intersubjective and social dimensions of
selfhood and identity for conceptions of individual autonomy and moral
and political agency.”99
In a relational feminist account, autonomy is neither a capacity that
individuals exercise in isolation and apart from any social context, nor a
capacity that is inevitably defined by one’s membership in one particular
community.
In the relational feminist’s view, autonomy fluctuates depending on
the general context in which a person may find herself at any given mo-
ment. This construction makes many feminists skeptical of attempts to con-
flate choice and consent with autonomy.100
Precisely because relational feminism takes account of a much wider
range of relationships in which the individual is embedded at any given
time, it problematizes consent much more thoroughly than libertarian or
law and economics theories.101 In Conflict of Laws, an indigenous popula-
tion’s implied or presumed intent to have the local law applied to the bene-
fit of the corporation in transnational torts, or, similarly, a surrogate
mother’s consent to the surrogacy contract (as well as to the application of
the law that validates it) are not presumed as autonomous acts when viewed
from a relational feminist lens. The social context of autonomy, as demon-
The 1990s, accordingly, are witnessing a renewed feminist interest in autonomy—
but as relationally conceived.”) [hereinafter Friedman, Autonomy and Social
Relationships].
98. Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, Introduction to RELATIONAL AUTONOMY,
supra note 13, at 3 –4.
99. Id.
100. See Susan Dodds, Choice and Control in Feminist Bioethics, in RELATIONAL AUTON-
OMY, supra note 13 at 213, 215. (“In making a rational choice in a pressing health-
care context, an individual would usually consider the currently available alterna-
tives; her current understanding of her values, desires, and goals; and what action or
choices she believes, based on the information she has, would be most likely to bring
about their realization. Her rational choice, however, may reflect heteronomously
acquired values, desires, and goals; her medical condition may affect her understand-
ing of herself and her priorities; the available information and alternatives may be the
result of autonomy-limiting policies and practices; and so on.”).
101. On the ethic of consent, see generally Robin West and her engagement with Richard
Posner. Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the
Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384
(1985); Richard Posner, The Ethical Significance of Free Choice: A Reply to Professor
West, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1431 (1986); Robin West, Submission, Choice, and Ethics: A
Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1449 (1986).
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strated in the stark imbalance of power between the actors implicated in
these relationships, as well as the vast economic disparities between the
countries involved in the dispute, immediately challenge the presumption of
consent present in Conflict of Laws discourse.
On the other hand, autonomy is not immediately presupposed by vir-
tue of one’s membership in a community. In the initial articulations of rela-
tional autonomy, feminism registered ambivalence “between thinking that
autonomy should sometimes give way to relational values and thinking that
autonomy is itself relational.”102 This prompted feminist thinkers to theorize
the complex connections between autonomy and the “social,”103 such that
one could explain how autonomy “comes into being” but is also “harmed
through relationships with parents, teachers, and employers.”104
In Nedelsky’s account, autonomy is an important “capacity” for indi-
viduals that is only “made possible by constructive relationship[s].”105 This
means that as much as there is “a social component built into the meaning
of autonomy”106 this is not an “unqualified assumption that social relation-
ships are necessary to the realization of autonomy.”107 Relationships can be
nurturing, but also oppressive.108 In the next section, I explain the way in
which relational feminists ponder on the particular types of relationships
that may provide one or the other form of embeddedness. Here, I want to
point out that relational autonomy registers skepticism not just about par-
ticular kinds of relationships, including personal relationships, but the gen-
eral concept of community, including national community.109
102. Friedman, Autonomy and Social Relationships, supra note 97, at 55.
103. Id. at 56.
104. NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS, supra note 25, at 3 (parentheses removed).
105. Id. at 39. See also id. at 124 (“The necessary social dimension of the vision I am
sketching has two components. The first is the claim that the capacity to find one’s
own law can develop only in the context of relations that nurture this capacity. The
second is that the ‘content’ of one’s own law is comprehensible only with reference
to shared social norms, values, and concepts.”).
106. Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy, supra note 70, at 36.
107. Friedman, Autonomy and Social Relationships, supra note 97, at 55–56.
108. See NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS, supra note 25, at 122.
109. See Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, Introduction: Autonomy Refigured, in RE-
LATIONAL AUTONOMY, supra note 13, at 23 (“[F]eminists should be wary of an
alliance with communitarianism since the communitarian view that we are so consti-
tuted by social relations and shared values that we are unable to reconsider our at-
tachment to them is incompatible with a feminist commitment to communities of
choice.”). See also Linda Barclay, Autonomy and the Social Self, in RELATIONAL AU-
TONOMY, supra note 13, at 67 (“It has been noted by a number of feminists that
communitarian valorization of ‘traditions,’ ‘community,’ ‘tribe’ and ‘nation’ fre-
quently ignore their sexist and racist practices and the multifarious ways in which
they contribute to gender oppression, the subjugation of certain ethnic groups, the
exclusion of gays, and so on.”).
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Since relational feminists reject the image of the atomistic, isolated
individual, one might assume that feminists would feel more comfortable
referencing a social community, the state or state sovereignty. But precisely
because feminists understand the potential limitations and constraints that
the social context imposes on human, and especially women’s, empower-
ment, “feminists are particularly unlikely to romanticize ‘community.’”110
Indeed, feminists rebuke claims to authority merely in the name of the com-
munity. As Katharine Bartlett explained, feminism includes:
[A] commitment to the notion that there is not one, but many
overlapping communities to which one might look for “reason.”
Feminists consider the concept of community problematic be-
cause they have demonstrated that law has tended to reflect ex-
isting structures of power. Carrying over their concern for
inclusion from asking the woman question, feminists insist that
no one community is legitimately privileged to speak for all
others.111
In 1993 when feminism had “yet to develop a sustained and direct
critique of the sovereign state in international law,”112 Karen Knop cata-
logued the ways in which feminism can be used to challenge notions of state
sovereignty in Public International Law.113 First, relational feminism might
accept an analogy between the state and the individual but argue that, just
like the individual, the state should be understood in relational terms.114
Another type of feminist critique against sovereignty underscores the ten-
dency to equate sovereignty with power rather than justice, such that inter-
state recognition and cooperation is premised on power and consent, rather
than the level of justice states provide to various constituents, including
women.115
Although feminist critiques have yet to focus on Conflict of Laws, the
substance of these initial critiques of Public International Law are familiar
and well-entrenched in Conflict of Laws theory and methodology. The ar-
gument that states do not exist in isolation, but must instead recognize each
other and, implicitly, each other’s laws, rests at the core of most internation-
110. NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS, supra note 25, at 122.
111. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, supra note 24, at 855.
112. Karen Knop, Borders of the Imagination: The State in Feminist International Law, 88
A.S.I.L. PROC. 14, 14 (1994).
113. Karen Knop, Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in International Law, 3
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONT. PROBS. 293 (1993) [hereinafter Knop, Re/Statements].
114. Id. at 323.
115. Id. at 328–30.
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alist theories in Conflict of Laws.116 It has even been accepted by particular-
ist theories under the recognition that each state must have some set of
Conflict of Laws rules.117 In turn, public policy has served as a correcting
factor to this cosmopolitan premise of interstate cooperation and recogni-
tion. Although it may still not be in line with many feminist theories, the
principle behind this public policy is that a state would not recognize a
foreign rule of law if its application would lead to a result that is inconsis-
tent with the fundamental values and principles of the jurisdiction of the
court hearing a legal matter. Feminist theories would have much to contrib-
ute to a debate about what should be included in this category. Recently,
Ivana Isailovic showed the complex analysis informed by feminist insights
that must be applied when French courts adjudicate questions regarding veil
wearing.118 Although the public policy exception remains a contentious
matter in Conflict of Laws, at least in part the rationale behind its existence
mirrors the feminist critique that recognition of sovereignty and interstate
cooperation should include a way to question the justice, not just the power
of another state.
My interest, however, lies in the third possibility of feminist critique
that Karen Knop identifies under the heading “breaking down the state.”119
Knop writes that:
In the post-modern cacophony of the late twentieth century, it is
clear that whatever the analogic conventions of international law,
the State is not a unified self. It encompasses a variety of groups
and performs a variety of functions. These functions do not nec-
essarily serve the interests of all groups. For some functions, the
advantaged group may be the entire population, while for others,
116. For a general account of the internationalist school of thought, see Henri Batiffol,
Principes de droit international privé, 97 RECUEIL DES COURS 431 (1959). For a
broad tracing of this school of thought and a critical note, see Arthur Nussbaum, Rise
and Decline of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws, 42 COLUM. L.
REV. 189 (1942).
117. See Franz Kahn, Abhandlungen aus dem internationalen Privatrecht, 40 JHERINGS
JAHRBÜCHER FÜR DIE DOGMATIK DES BÜRGERLICHEN RECHTS 1, 40–42 (1899)
(arguing that states are in principle free to adopt whatever rules of Conflict of Laws
they wish, but states must have some system of Conflict of Laws, must not commit
“abuses under international law,” and that there may be “certain concessions that
states might make towards the international community”).
118. See Ivana Isailovic, Political Recognition and Transnational Law, Gender Equality and
Cultural Diversification, in PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERN-
ANCE 318 (Horatia Muir Watt & Diego P. Fernández Arroyo eds., 2015).
119. Knop, Re/Statements, supra note 113, at 332.
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a group within the State or spread across State boundaries may
be disadvantaged.120
From this realization, Knop asks, “regardless of whether sovereignty
ultimately resides in the government or the people why should there be a
single sovereign order coterminous with the State? Why not have overlap-
ping sovereignties, fragmented sovereignties, layered sovereignties?”121
Relational feminism demonstrates that a critique of individualism
should not blind us to the perils and injustices of state-centrism. Rejecting
individualism and private abuse should not translate into an over-idealiza-
tion of the state and an uncritical deference to state sovereignty or state
interests.
As described above, Conflict of Laws critics have argued that the state
interest analysis does not respect legitimate bases of authority generated by
the social contract metaphor nor does it respect notions of formal equality.
Relational feminism brings an entirely different—as well as more conse-
quential—critique of state interest analysis, namely that it tends to reflect
and re-assert the interests of the more powerful.122
Relational feminism incorporates both the self-centered and commu-
nitarian components of autonomy. In the context of transnational surrogacy
disputes, relational feminism would encourage a Conflict of Laws theory
that takes into account the fact that the surrogate mother’s autonomy can-
not be defined either through choice and consent in all circumstances, nor
through her membership in a community that regards consent as the only
prerequisite to the validity of surrogacy arrangements. Courts hearing dis-
putes regarding international surrogacy arrangements often reason that the
national public policy declaring such arrangements illegal is trumped by the
consent of the parties to such arrangements, even when the conditions of
such consent are dubious on classical liberal accounts.123
120. Id. at 333.
121. Id.
122. For this rare perspective in Conflict of Laws, see Kramer, supra note 47, at 523. See
also Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, supra note 24, at 861 (discussing the ways in
which courts should engage in a very detailed analysis of state interests with the eye
to understanding whose view and interests are thereby subordinated or
marginalized).
123. For an argument that judges should see themselves as, first and foremost, respecting
parties’ state preferences, see West, Taking Preferences Seriously, supra note 95. For an
account of the increasingly important weight given to consent in transnational surro-
gacy cases in Australia, even when the circumstances of such consent are dubious, see
Keyes, supra note 30, at 42. The court must often balance public policy concerns
against the best interests of the child, and the best interests of the child often prevail.
Id. at 42–43.
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Relational feminism would disavow the alleged tension constructed in
the Conflict of Laws reasoning between a state’s public policy of disallowing
surrogacy arrangements and the autonomy of the parties (including the sur-
rogate mother) to enter into such arrangement elsewhere. Jennifer Nedelsky
explains that while “there often seems to be a tension between the desire to
enhance individual women’s scope for choice, control, or autonomy on the
one hand, and meeting collective goals such as equality for all women or
optimal conditions for children on the other,” this tension merely arises
from the uncritical association of autonomy with market exchange.124 In
contrast, “if we shift our attention to what makes it possible for everyone’s
capacity for autonomy to flourish and develop, some of the tension will
disappear or be recast.”125
A court in a jurisdiction with a policy against surrogacy arrangements
might very well interpret such a policy as meant to ensure the surrogate
mother’s autonomy where such autonomy is not equated with market trans-
actions over reproductive services.126 Not all market transactions can be seen
as equally valuable and representative of one’s autonomy. For example, de-
claring some such transactions, including the sale of people or slavery con-
tracts, as illegal is precisely a way of ensuring autonomy. As Robin West
argues:
My inclination to consent to a surrogacy contract may indeed
accurately reflect my “preferences,” but my preference for money
over the exclusive use of my reproductive capacities may itself be
a product of a culture that excessively (and to my detriment)
commodifies aspects of my being—including my labour, as well
as my sexuality and reproductive life.127
Recasting this alleged tension between a policy preventing surrogacy
arrangements and parties’ autonomy to enter such arrangements might in-
124. Jennifer Nedelsky, Property in Potential Life? A Relational Approach to Choosing Legal
Categories, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 343, 356 (1993) [hereinafter Nedelsky, Property in
Potential Life?].
125. Id.
126. For the view that surrogacy contracts should be viewed as any other type of contracts
for services, see Richard Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement,
81 VA. L. REV. 2305 (1995). For the opposite view from a relational perspective, see
West, Taking Preferences Seriously, supra note 95. For a perspective within Conflict of
Laws that surrogacy contracts should not be analogized to commercial contracts see
Antoon (Teun) V. M. Struycken, Surrogacy, A New Way to Become a Mother? A New
Private International Law Issue, in CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 368 (K. Boele-Woelki et al. eds., 2010).
127. West, Taking Preferences Seriously, supra note 95, at 671.
28 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 24:1
struct a court hearing a dispute over a transnational surrogacy arrangement
to consider the conditions in which the surrogate mother consented and
might even provide for visitation rights or other forms of contact between
the child and the surrogate mother.128
C. Embracing, Restructuring, Transcending Relationships
Thus far, I have argued that the perception of the regulatory function
of Conflict of Laws is channeled primarily through an individualistic or a
state-centric perspective. I have also shown that relational feminists’ recon-
struction of autonomy offers firm theoretical ground on which to rethink
the premises and value of both the individualistic and the state-centric per-
spectives. But does it offer an alternative for rethinking the central questions
Conflict of Laws asks and how it perceives its regulatory function? In this
section, I argue that it does when we insist that Conflict of Laws norms, like
all legal norms, be drafted with an eye to relationships among people in the
transnational realm. This initial proposition reveals that, for a field that is
central to the regulation of transnational interpersonal relationships, Con-
flict of Laws theory and methodology fail almost entirely to engage with the
relationships themselves and with the relational nature of transnational life.
In this section, I argue that relational feminism would refocus traditional
Conflict of Laws norms on the patterns of relationships they currently struc-
ture or help maintain. To incorporate this insight, Conflict of Laws would
need to analyze the private law relationships in dispute in a much larger
social context and would need to appreciate the litigating parties’ appeals to
the application of particular laws as appeals to the recognition, restructur-
ing, or transcending of particular patterns of relationships in the transna-
tional realm.
Conflict of Laws would first need to incorporate Jennifer Nedelsky’s
insight that:
[Individuals are embedded in] networks of relation-
ships . . . networks that range from intimate relations with par-
128. In a recent comparative study on national practices and rules on transnational surro-
gacy arrangements, Katarina Trimmings and Paul Beaumont argued for the adoption
of an international instrument of coordination among national central authorities,
similar to the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoptions. The authors argue that
there should be a pre-approval mechanism in which adequate safeguards for all par-
ties would be checked and ensured, including the conditions of consent and a grace
period for the surrogate mother. See Katarina Trimmings & Paul Beaumont, General
Report on Surrogacy, in INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS: LEGAL REGU-
LATION AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 439, 531 (Katarina Trimmings & Paul
Beaumont eds., 2013) [hereinafter General Report].
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ents, friends, or lovers to relations between student and teacher,
welfare recipient and caseworker, citizen and state, to being par-
ticipants in a global economy, migrants in a world of gross eco-
nomic inequality, inhabitants of a world shaped by global
warming.129
Individuals are embedded in a wide range of relationships, such that
“the formative relations of parent and child, among siblings, and between
husband and wife are all shaped by the wider societal, cultural relations of
which they are a part.”130 This means that the individuals within the private
law relationships in dispute are each part of a much larger network of rela-
tionships. Conflict of Laws would need to grapple with the position of these
individuals and their relationships in this much wider social web.
Yet it is precisely in this relationship between individuals and the social
context that relational feminists register the ambivalence discussed above.
Relational feminists recognize that there is no “core ‘inner self’ untainted by
social influence.”131 But relational feminism is not prepared to embrace
communitarians’ substitution of autonomy for the common good or to ac-
cept “inherited relationships” as the inevitable makeup of one’s identity.132
As Penny Weiss argues, “communitarians are concerned with the loss of
‘traditional boundaries,’ while feminists are concerned with the costs of those
boundaries, especially for women.”133 For feminists, “[t]he truth that selves
are socially determined carries with it a certain liberating potential, a denial
that social roles need be fixed and a repudiation of the claim that selves have
an immutable nature that determines their roles.”134
Therefore the particular contribution of feminism to relational theory
is that the feminist lens can both recognize relationships that foster and
enhance individual autonomy and restructure or even transcend oppressive,
unjust relationships. Conflict of Laws should incorporate this relational
feminist insight as a tool to recognize, restructure, or transcend particular
relationships.
129. NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS, supra note 25, at 19.
130. Id. at 20.
131. See Linda Barclay, Autonomy and the Social Self, in RELATIONAL AUTONOMY, supra
note 13, at 59.
132. See id. at 67.
133. Penny A. Weiss, Feminism and Communitarianism: Comparing Critiques of Liber-
alism, in FEMINISM AND COMMUNITY 161, 167 (Penny A. Weiss & Marilyn Fried-
man eds., 1995).
134. See Linda Barclay, Autonomy and the Social Self, in RELATIONAL AUTONOMY, supra
note 13, at 67.
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1. Recognizing Valuable Relationships
Horatia Muir Watt criticized Conflict of Laws recently for failing to
provide a methodological approach that would ensure the recognition of
relationships in the transnational realm that are vital for one’s identity and
relational self. “In a nutshell, the idea is that personal relationships created
elsewhere, under a foreign law (and according to a potentially different un-
derstanding of their meaning and content), should be given a place (within
the society and under the law of the forum) as such, respecting their spe-
cific, initial characteristics.”135 She notes that “for the moment, recognition
in private international law is perceived largely as a competing, and oppos-
ing, methodological approach to individual trans-border relationships, for
which traditional tools have had to make room, owing to the direct vertical
and horizontal effects of hard-core human rights instruments.”136 For exam-
ple, in the EU context, a human rights-based perspective is necessary in
order to achieve the “cross-border continuity of a parent-child relationship
on the dignitarian ground of the right to a normal family life”137 or to
obtain the recognition of a family name across borders as the corollary of
the necessary “coherence of individual status of mobile citizens within the
internal market.”138
The paradigm of recognition that Muir Watt seeks to introduce into
Conflict of Laws focuses on “social reality,”139 rather than dogmatic and
abstract notions of law and rights; on fluid notions of reasonable expecta-
tions, rather than methodological play;140 on “open-textured and delibera-
tive normative modes, sensitive to life experiences with which it interacts”
rather than “formal rationality of the law”;141 and on “a method of care,
respect for alterity, protection of dignity and identity, which are to a large
extent excluded by the abstraction of private international law methodol-
ogy.”142 But Muir Watt is also cautious in suggesting that recognition
should be limited to “personhood and family relationships.”143 Her intui-
135. See Muir Watt, supra note 11, at 367.
136. See id. at 369.
137. See id. at 369 (discussing two judgments from the European Court of Human Rights
and European Court of Justice).
138. Id. at 369 (“If concerns for individual and collective dignity and identity, associated
in other disciplinary fields with the recognition paradigm, have made a recent en-
trance into private international law, it has been through the transnational effects of
fundamental rights.”).
139. Id. at 372.
140. Id. at 373.
141. Id. at 375.
142. Id. at 378.
143. Id. at 367, n. 102 (explaining “[t]he scope of recognition cannot be defined dog-
matically, in the way in which traditional methodological tools determine their pur-
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tion might be that recognition may be confused with an overly liberal, pos-
sibly individualistic concept. If applied to the wide variety of Conflict of
Laws matters, it could simultaneously achieve the recognition of identity
and dignity, as well as individualistic property and contract claims.
But relational feminism would enable Conflict of Laws to recognize all
types of relationships. While recognition of family and personal relation-
ships might be more common, some may certainly wish to rely on Conflict
of Laws rules to escape inequitable or violent personal relationships. And
while critical projects might now be more attuned to the way in which
many might wish to rely on Conflict of Laws rules to contest inequitable
contract and property relationships, many feminist projects show the poten-
tial empowering nature of such relationships for many otherwise disadvan-
taged individuals.144
2. Restructuring Oppressive Patterns of Relationships
Conflict of Laws often imagines the choice of law question in transna-
tional tort matters as a question of vested rights, formal equality, or conflicts
of sovereignty or state interests. However, Conflict of Laws can be used to
restructure oppressive relationships. For example, by pleading for the appli-
cation of the higher standard of care and damage quantum under the tort
law of the jurisdiction of a corporation’s headquarters, indigenous popula-
tions may attempt to restructure an investment relationship characterized by
inequality in wealth and bargaining power. In a recent decision in the fa-
mous Chevron saga, the Canadian Supreme Court struggled to tweak com-
ity, the rules of international jurisdiction, and enforcement of foreign
judgments, due to its acknowledgment that the indigenous population was
“seeking assistance” in Canadian courts.145 But the court made no com-
ments of what kind of assistance was sought beyond or implicit in the rec-
ognition and enforcement of the monetary debt and failed to engage
entirely with the argument that human rights considerations might be in-
view, for the epistemological reasons that will be explained later. Recognition
responds, rather, to a need stemming from the denial of identity, which will tend to
circumscribe its use to personhood and family relationships. . . . A tort or criminal
case may ALSO involve issues of recognition, if only through procedural issues of
standing, for example.”).
144. See generally PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (Harvard
Univ. Press 1991); A.A. Alyetoro & Adrienne Davis, Historic and Modern Social
Movements for Reparations: The National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America
(N’COBRA) and Its Antecedents, 16 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 687 (2010).
145. Chevron Corp. v. Yaiguaje, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 69, paras. 8, 19 (Can.).
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volved.146 Through a relational feminist lens we may see that implicit in
these requests to apply one law or another, or to recognize a judgment
abroad, are actions to restructure relationships built on inequality.
3. Transcending Oppressive or Undesired
Relationships and Communities
One of the main ways in which Conflict of Laws norms have allowed
individuals to transcend oppressive laws and oppressive regimes might have
been through the application of domicile versus citizenship. Karen Knop
argues forcefully that the principle of domicile gives rise to a kind of “pri-
vate citizenship” which allows individuals to integrate themselves in com-
munities other than those of nationality and have the law of the state of
domicile applied to a variety of their claims in private law.147 As she explains
in a recent piece, domicile requires a different kind of relationship of indi-
viduals generally, and women particularly, to the state. Hence women could
establish domicile simply because they were caregivers in the home, even if
they had no presence in the public life of the state.148 Knop’s feminist analy-
sis encourages Conflict of Laws to acknowledge that the choice to adopt
domicile over citizenship may empower individuals to transcend oppressive
communities and relationships.
However, in Conflict of Laws, the domicile versus citizenship debate
has often been understood as a civil law versus common law divide or a
preference for territorial or personal elements of state sovereignty. For this
reason, late nineteenth century attempts to pursue divorce proceedings by
changing domicile were often described as affronts to sovereignty or eva-
sions of ethical considerations common in one’s community—where com-
munity affiliation was described by reference to citizenship.149 By contrast,
relational feminism would allow us to see that Conflict of Laws debates
about choosing domicile over citizenship, or the place of the tort over the
146. The International Human Rights Program at the University of Toronto, Min-
ingWatch Canada, and the Canadian Centre for International Justice filed a Factum
as joint interveners, but the court did not engage with their arguments in its deci-
sions. The Factum is available at: http://ihrp.law.utoronto.ca/utfl_file/count/PUBLI-
CATIONS/KLIPPENSTEINSChevronFactum%20-OTT_LAW-4722211-v1.pdf.
147. Karen Knop, Citizenship Public and Private, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 309,
319–20. (2008).
148. See Karen Knop, Feminism and the Lost Private Side of International Law (unpub-
lished Article) (on file with author).
149. See JOSEPHUS JITTA, THE RENOVATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE BASIS OF
A JURIDICAL COMMUNITY OF MANKIND, SYSTEMATICALLY DEVELOPED 106 (Marti-
nus Nijhoff 1919) (critiquing precisely this disempowering of people, especially
women, by not allowing them to change their domicile and thereby have a favorable
law applied to their petitions for divorce).
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place of incorporation, as connecting factors for the determination of the
applicable law in large private law categories are futile. Neither domicile,
nor citizenship, neither the place of tort, nor the place of incorporation, are
preferable connecting factors as such. Relational analysis does not endorse a
particular connecting factor; rather, it selects a particular connecting factor
dependent on the structure of relationships that one wants to achieve.
Relational feminists’ focus on the patterns of relationships structured
through law would not only be useful at the stage of determining the appli-
cable law and opting for one connecting factor over another. It should also
inform the Conflict of Laws analysis at an earlier and often crucial analytical
step, namely characterization.
Because each private law category has its own choice of law norms, the
Conflict of Laws analysis usually starts by characterizing the legal matter as a
contract, family law matter, tort, etc. Courts have struggled to characterize
transnational surrogacy agreements from among the three options refer-
enced by the Report on Transnational Surrogacy Matters drawn up by the
Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law:
contract, filiation, or adoption.150
It is at this initial stage that relational feminism could contribute sub-
stantially to Conflict of Laws reasoning. Jennifer Nedesky has argued for a
relational approach to choosing legal categories.  Specifically, she has
demonstrated the way in which creating a property right in various forms of
potential life creates a variety of patterns of relationships (e.g. women with
their bodies, the intended parents with the child and/or the surrogate
mother, and among women in different countries).151 She concludes that
“the choice of property as a legal framework will entail a choice of a particu-
lar vision of autonomy, one which has inequality embedded in it.”152 Nedel-
sky argues that when choosing a legal category for different forms of
potential life, we need to have in mind the types of relationships we want to
structure, which she identifies as threefold: relationships of respect and ap-
preciation for children, relationships of respect for women and honoring of
their reproductive capacities and labor, and relations of equality between
people of all classes and backgrounds, and specifically, between men and
women.153 This initial relational lens raises doubts about the suitability of
150. Hague Conference Report, The Permanent Bureau, Private International Law Issues
Surrounding the Status of Children, Including Issues Arising From International
Surrogacy Arrangements (2011), https://assets.hcch.net/docs/f5991e3e-0f8b-430c-
b030-ca93c8ef1c0a.pdf [hereinafter Hague Conference Report].
151. See Nedelsky, Property in Potential Life?, supra note 124.
152. Id. at 350.
153. Id.
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placing surrogacy under any of the three categories, and further, illuminates
the proper process of choosing between them.
Analyzing surrogacy as a contract might express a conviction that there
is nothing particularly different about a contract for carrying and giving
birth of a child from an agreement for goods or services.154 It would also
place surrogacy under a presumed ethic of consent that is prevalent in con-
tract matters. This might entrench the presumption that Robin West criti-
cized at length that “[a]ll our contracts reflect our private preferences that in
turn reflect our private desires, which, if satisfied, will produce value.”155
From a relational feminist perspective, this would mean simplifying, indeed
eliminating, the entire contextual framework in which surrogacy contracts
occur: the fact that many surrogate mothers come from extremely poor
countries, while intended parents often reside in wealthier countries;156 that
because of the disparity of wealth, the sum paid to a surrogate mother might
be several times higher than her husband’s yearly income;157 that many
women may indeed be coerced, trafficked, raped, or utterly misinformed
about the entire process and of their rights.158 Similarly, if surrogacy ar-
rangements were categorized as contracts, deference would most likely be
given to the parties’ decisions regarding choice of law in Conflict of Laws
disputes.
154. For the view that surrogacy should be treated as a matter of contract law, see generally
Epstein, supra note 126. For the view that surrogacy matters should be analyzed in
relationship to adoption matters, see Susan Appleton, Adoption in the Age of Repro-
ductive Technology, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 393, 443 (2004).
155. See West, Taking Preferences Seriously, supra note 95, at 661.
156. See Hague Conference Report, supra note 150, at para. 12. See generally Richard F.
Storrow, Quests for Conception: Fertility Tourists, Globalization and Feminist Legal
Theory, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 295 (2005) (showing how developed countries create a
market for surrogacy arrangements in less developed countries).
157. See Hague Conference Report, supra note 150, at para. 34; Usha Rengachary
Smerdon, Crossing Bodies, Crossing Borders: International Surrogacy Between the
United States and India, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 15, 54 (2008).
158. See Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre & British Embassy in Hanoi,
The trafficking of women and children from Vietnam, 12 (2011), https://
ceop.police.uk/Documents/ceopdocs/NPM_CEOP_FCO_report_-_trafficking_of_
Vietnamese_women_and_children.pdf (describing “a baby selling ring operating out
of Bangkok, Thailand and Phnom Penh, Cambodia”). Reporting:
They were connected to a Taiwanese surrogacy service which profiled the
surrogate mothers on their website. During the investigation, 14 trafficked
Vietnamese women were identified as being exploited as surrogate mothers
for this company. The women were forcibly impregnated with other
women’s embryos or raped. The service was designed for wealthy Taiwanese
couples with the total process costing $32,000.
Id.
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Characterizing the recognition of surrogacy agreements as questions of
“filiation” would bring the matters into the realm of the family, and simul-
taneously exclude the issues of contract characterization described above.
But questions of filiation generally refer to the establishment of parental
rights of one parent, often the father, in relation to the child.159 Especially
in cases in which the intended father, but not the intended mother, offered
genetic material, questions of filiation will create a gendered reference to
paternal rights, leaving the intended mother merely with the option of
“adoption.”160 More importantly, when categorized as filiation, Conflict of
Laws reasoning will inevitably break the multiparty relationship into one-to-
one categories with often inconsistent and inconsiderate results.161
A similar tendency to split and separate the interests involved can be
seen in courts’ increasing focus in transnational surrogacy matters on “the
best interests of the child.”162 Given that Conflict of Laws matters involving
surrogacy often arise at a late stage in which the child is already born, and in
159. See generally General Report, supra note 128, at 527. Finding that:
In relation to legal parenthood these remedies normally offer partial solu-
tions only, whereby merely the position of the intended father is regu-
larised. The position of the intended mother (or the intended father in the
case of gay intended parents) remains uncertain, with often no or only lim-
ited options of acquiring legal parenthood.
Id.
160. See id. at 518 (noting how, in several countries including Germany, Switzerland, and
France, acknowledgments of paternity would be recognized, although this avenue is
not available for the intended mothers. In particular, the [French] Conseil d’Etat
suggested that “the prohibition of the establishment of maternity between the in-
tended mother and the child should be maintained.” However, “acknowledgment of
paternity should become the main alternative to the prohibition of surrogacy.”).
161. See id. at 501. Finding that:
In some cases, the intended father was able to establish his legal parenthood
using the avenue of ‘acknowledgment of paternity.’ Nevertheless, in none of
these cases was the intended mother (even if genetically related to the child)
able to regularise her relationship with the child. As a result, the intended
mother was placed in a very vulnerable position, especially in the event of a
custody dispute or paternal death.
Id.
162. See id. at 528. Finding that:
In jurisdictions where the ad hoc, partial remedies have been crafted, there
is a clear trend to focus primarily on the best interests of the child, with the
result that the welfare principle trumps the public policy concerns that sur-
round cross-border (in particular commercial) surrogacy. . . . Given the
absence of a regulatory framework, this line of reasoning is considered rea-
sonable. . . . This is not to say, however, that the current situation is desira-
ble or satisfactory.
Id.
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those cases there is often no evidence that the surrogate mother would want
to maintain the child, it is entirely reasonable for courts to focus on the
“best interests of the child” and to rule in favor of the intended parents
obtaining parental rights. However, if the surrogate mother wishes to exer-
cise parental rights, this standard is less helpful. Relational feminists have
argued that the “best interests of the child” standard tends to ignore pre-
existing relationships between the child and one or the other parent and
disrupts such relationships when it is argued that it is in the “best interests
of the child” to be placed with another parent.163
In the context of custody disputes, Katherine Bartlett argues that
while the best interest of the child is an advancement over emphasis on
parents’ rights or interests, the standard merely substitutes the interest of
one party over another, instead of focusing on “what kind of children and
families—what kind of relationships we want to have.”164 A “re-expression
of parenthood,” argues Bartlett, would need to focus on “responsibility, re-
lationship, and identification.”165 Relational feminism would allow Conflict
of Laws decision-makers to realize that neither arguments about the rights
of individual parents due to their genetic material,166 nor the “best interests
of the child” standard, should obscure an analysis of what kind of relation-
ships among and between the child, the birth mother, and the intended
parents would be best to construct in particular cases, and how determining
that one law or another is applicable will impact that outcome.
In its 2012 report on transnational surrogacy arrangements, the Hague
Commission highlighted that characterizing the relationship as one of adop-
tion has proven strenuous as a practical matter.167 This is because many of
the conditions of the Hague Convention on Inter-country Adoptions, in-
cluding the requirement that the gestational mother give consent after the
birth of the child, seemed inapplicable to surrogacy matters.168 But from a
relational feminist perspective, express or legal terminological analogies be-
163. See Nina Camic, Putting the Relational into the Heart of Family and Juvenile Court
Proceedings, 16 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 198–99 (2002).  For a very interesting relational
perspective on how an uncritical focus on the best interests of the child combined
with a prevailing shared parenting norm creates unreasonable burdens on women’s
autonomy, see Susan B. Boyd, Autonomy for Mothers? Relational Theory and Parenting
Apart, 18 FEM. LEG. STUD. 137 (2010).
164. Katharine Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 303 (1988).
165. See id. at 298–99.
166. For a detailed analysis of the increased focus on genetic factors in courts’ analysis of
international surrogacy arrangements, see Samantha Ashenden, Reproblematising Re-
lations of Agency and Coercion: Surrogacy, in GENDER, AGENCY, AND COERCION 195
(Sumi Madhok, Anne Phillips & Kalpana Wilson eds., 2013).
167. See Hague Conference Report, supra note 150, at para. 43.
168. See id. at para. 43.
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tween surrogacy and adoptions matter less. Instead, the portrayal of transna-
tional surrogacy arrangements as similar to transnational adoption matters
would structure more equitable and just relationships between all parties
involved. Viewed in that way, relational feminists might welcome a possible
analogy between transnational surrogacy agreements and adoptions within
the field of Conflict of Laws.
For example, Patricia Williams and Mary Lyndon Shanley argue that
not allowing the surrogate mother to reassess her initial decision to surren-
der the baby after giving birth equates surrogacy arrangements to enslave-
ment.169 Reading a mandatory grace period into transnational surrogacy
arrangements might therefore increase the surrogate mother’s autonomy and
respect the bond she has formed with the child during the nine months of
pregnancy.
Similarly, Mary Lyndon Shanley argues that only “gift” surrogacies
should be allowed and that they could be “treated like pre-adoption agree-
ments that leave the birth mother free to decide not to relinquish custody at
birth.”170 Doing so would recognize the full range of interpersonal relation-
ships that are constructed in the context of surrogacy.
Comparing fertility tourism (including for surrogate agreements) with
sex tourism and international adoptions, while exploring “interconnections
between the global and the local dynamics of phenomena that implicate the
place of women in society,” Richard Storrow argues that this “comparison
disturbingly reveals more parallels between fertility tourism and sex tourism,
forms of global commerce to which the international community has been
largely indifferent, than between fertility tourism and international adop-
tion, concerns about which have received sustained international attention
and response.”171
Many have already pointed out that the stringent restrictions for trans-
national adoptions would increase the number of transnational surrogacy
arrangements for which there is far less and far murkier regulation.172 Ap-
plying the level of stringency used for transnational adoptions to transna-
tional surrogacies would at least strongly discourage the proliferation of
transnational surrogacy arrangements over adoptions. Informed by rela-
169. Ashenden, supra note 166, at 630; Patricia J. Williams, On Being the Object of Prop-
erty, 14 SIGNS 5, 15 (1988).
170. Mary Lyndon Shanley, “Surrogate Mothering” and Women’s Freedom: A Critique of
Contracts for Human Reproduction, 18 SIGNS 618, 624 (1993) (arguing that “only
payment of medical and living expenses would be allowed,” while also acknowledg-
ing, “I am ambivalent about whether any further payment should ever be
permitted.”).
171. Storrow, supra note 156, at 329–30.
172. Rengachary Smerdon, supra note 157, at 15.
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tional feminist perspectives, the analytical step of characterization within
Conflict of Laws can contribute precisely to such leveling of regulatory over-
sight between transnational surrogacy and adoption arrangements.
D. Fluid Analysis and Judicial Self-Consciousness
Since the feminist relational method complicates both the notion of
the self and any notion of responsibility, it inevitably encourages a very fluid
legal analysis. And as Nedelsky candidly admits, it may be that “the down-
side, or limitation, of the relational approach . . . is exactly its fluidity. The
resistance (not imperviousness) to reification and simplified absolutism or
certainty comes at the cost of the uncertainty inherent in ongoing, open-
ended inquiry.”173 Under the relational methodology, “there is an inevitable
element of uncertainty, even speculation, in the claims that a given form of
law would promote a certain structure of relations.”174 It is precisely the
complexity of relational analysis that prompts feminist scholars to reflect
more deeply on the process of decision making in light of increased
complexity.
Katherine Bartlett, for example, wondered how feminists could pro-
vide “knowledge” and “truth” and thereby unequivocally identify the vic-
tim, the oppressor, the deceiver, the liar, etc.175 She argued in favor of
positionality, “which acknowledges the existence of empirical truth, values
and knowledge, and also their contingency.”176 According to this perspec-
tive, truth itself is “situated in that it emerges from particular involvements
and relationships. These relationships, not some essential or innate charac-
teristics of the individual, define the individual’s perspective and provide the
location for meaning, identity, and political commitment.”177 The key to
extending knowledge then “lies in the effort to extend one’s limited perspec-
tive. Self-discipline is crucial.”178
Iris Young argued that impartiality expresses a crude desire to subsume
human nature under the rational and disembodied model. Thus, “the will
to unity expressed by this ideal of impartial and universal reason generates
an oppressive opposition between reason and desire or affectivity.”179 This
means that a particular conceptualization of reason implied in the process of
173. NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS, supra note 25, at 344.
174. Id. at 344.
175. Bartlett, supra note 24, at 880.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 881.
179. Iris Young, Impartiality and the Civil Public: Some Implications of Feminist Critiques of
Moral and Political Theory, in FEMINISM AS CRITIQUE: ON THE POLITICS OF GEN-
DER 57, 59 (Seyla Benhabib & Drucilla Cornell eds., 1987).
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judging and political deliberation, if confined to an ethic of justice, “has
implications for access to power and privilege,” such that many individuals
who do not conform to the ethic of justice, including some women, would
be marginalized in the political process and misrepresented in the process of
judging their claims.180  Furthermore, as Robin West argued, it may dis-
courage judges themselves from referencing an ethic of care, and therefore
empathy, towards the litigating parties.181
Jennifer Nedelsky also explains that relational analysis requires a high
level of ongoing self-consciousness about “the unavoidable uncertainty not
only of imperfect information but also of the predictions involved in the
claims of links between law, relations, and values. It asks judges and others
invoking rights and projects of transformation to be self-conscious about
the contested quality of the values and the uncertainties about what will
advance them.”182
Properly engaging with Nedelsky’s work on judging and drawing from
it for Conflict of Laws theory would require and deserve a separate-Article.
Here I merely want to reference some of its core insights and sketch what
contribution they could make to Conflict of Laws.
Much of Nedelsky’s work on judging is focused on the possibility of
impartiality in light of the “inevitability of subjectivity,”183 as well as on the
reciprocal relation of judgment and autonomy.184 Drawing partly on
Hannah Arendt’s work, Nedelsky argues that judgment is community-
based, such that “when one judges, one judges as a member of one’s com-
munity.”185 “Judgment always remains tied to the particular” and is emi-
nently subjective.186 But this does not mean either that it is inevitably
arbitrary or that it inevitably references one’s community standpoint.187
Since autonomy is relational, autonomous judgment is relational so that
“taking the perspectives of others is part of, not a substitute for, judg-
180. Jennifer Nedelsky, Embodied Diversity and the Challenges to Law, 42 MCGILL L.J. 91,
99 (1997).
181. West, Taking Preferences Seriously, supra note 95.
182. NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS, supra note 25, at 344.
183. Jennifer Nedelsky, The Reciprocal Relation of Judgment and Autonomy: Walking in
Another’s Shoes and Which Shoes to Walk In, in BEING RELATIONAL: REFLECTIONS
ON RELATIONAL THEORY AND HEALTH LAW 35–36 (Jocelyn Downie & Jennifer J.
Llewellyn eds., 2012) [hereinafter Nedelsky, Judgment and Autonomy].
184. Id. at 44.
185. Jennifer Nedelsky, Communities of Judgment and Human Rights, 1 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 245, 259 (2000) [hereinafter Nedelsky, Communities of Judgment].
186. Id. at 258.
187. Nedelsky, Judgment and Autonomy, supra note 183, at 36 (arguing “the inevitability
of subjectivity in judgment should not lead to a collapse into the inevitability of
arbitrariness”).
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ment.”188  Autonomous qua relational judgment then requires an “enlarged
mentality” by constantly tapping into the standpoint of other communi-
ties.189 Furthermore, one needs to be self-conscious about the fact that that
standpoint too is “relational, as people stand in different relations to their
location.”190
But “[t]his does not mean that we should simply grant authority to
another’s perspective, assume that it requires no further judgment because
of the ‘location’ from which it was made (which the crude version of femi-
nist standpoint theory suggests).”191 In this way, “[t]here is not a universal
standpoint of humanity that one arrives at, but one’s own general stand-
point, developed through attention to the particulars of the different stand-
points one considers.”192
This relational process of judgment challenges the inevitability of the
extreme positions of neutral or arbitrary judgment. Furthermore, “the idea
of multiple communities and communities sustained in one’s imagination
based on past experience and education makes it possible to understand
how community-based judgment can judge against one’s community.”193
Moreover, community-based judgment allows us to understand how
one could claim validity across communities without necessarily choosing
between communities of judgment:194
We do face the question of how claims of validity are to be made
across competing communities. But in most instances, a simple
choice of one community over the other will not work well, ei-
ther for the psychological integrity of the judge (assuming some
real connection to the conflicting communities) or for the insti-
tutional efficacy of rights-enforcing organizations.195
Much of Conflict of Laws theory and methodology references, directly
or implicitly, a particular fear of actual “judging” between competing claims
188. Id. at 41, 44.
189. Nedelsky, Communities of Judgment, supra note 185, at 259.
190. Nedelsky, Judgment and Autonomy, supra note 183, at 42.
191. Id. at 43 (arguing “the way we take another’s perspective into account should be
shaped both by the kind of judgment that we think she exercised as well as by our
own humility about our capacity to understand standpoints that are very different
from our own and consciousness of the asymmetries of power that may interfere.”).
192. Nedelsky, Communities of Judgment, supra note 185, at 258.
193. Id. at 275.
194. Id. at 277.
195. Id. at 276.
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of communities.196 “Choice of law” as the part of Conflict of Laws deter-
mining which law applies to a particular transnational dispute can be under-
stood quite literally.197 The process is generally premised on the neutral
“choice” of a law among competing ones, not “judging” which one is pref-
erable. Theorists have offered varying rationales for rejecting a Conflict of
Laws approach that requires judging the relative merits of different laws.
The Savignyan model, at least in its classical understanding, was based
on the equality between the litigating parties and between the different legal
systems involved.198 His framework was understood to mean that one
should pre-determine which law applies in large categories of private law,
such that the applicable law would not depend on the idiosyncrasies of the
national court hearing the matter, nor on which party rushes to commence
litigation in a particular court.199 Case-by-case judging seemed incompatible
with the initial postulate of formal equality between the litigating parties
and the legal systems. Moreover, the acknowledgment that on the same facts
different national courts might reach different results and the fear of the
cacophony of perspectives that might result in Conflict of Laws seemed to
validate the fear of much substantive judging in Conflict of Laws.
196. For a discussion of the way in which Conflict of Laws fails to encourage actual
judging between different policies and values under the competing laws, see generally
FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE (Martinus
Nijhoff ed., 1992).
197. This was one of the main lines of critique of the American realist school in Conflict
of Laws, but as I explain below, one of its main protagonists, Brainard Currie,
equally discouraged judgment between competing policies. For various arguments
within the American realist school against Conflict of Laws’ discouragement of judg-
ing which law would be preferable to apply in substantive terms, see generally DAVID
CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS, 1933–1983 (1985); Walter
Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457
(1924); Walter Wheeler Cook, The Jurisdiction of Sovereign States and the Conflict of
Laws, 31 COLUM L. REV. 368 (1931). For two prominent approaches within the
American realist school which were proposed as a way of judging which law is better
in substantive terms, see ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 107 (3d
ed. 1977); Luther L. McDougal III, Toward Application of the Best Rule of Law in
Choice of Law Cases, 35 MERCER L. REV. 483 (1984).
198. For a detailed discussion of the focus on equality between nationals and foreigners
and between legal systems in Savigny’s theory, see Egon Lorenz, Zur Struktur des
Internationalen Privatrechts (Duncker & Humblot eds., 1977).
199. Horatia Muir Watt, for example, argued that Savignyan Conflict of Laws thought is
premised on a certain ‘naturality’ of its principles and norms, rather than a princi-
pled judging of competing values and policies. See Muir Watt, supra note 15. I leave
out the question whether this was indeed Savigny’s perspective or whether this was
the conventional way of understanding Savigny. For a plea to separate “Savigny”
from “Savignyanism,” see Pierre Gothot, Simples réflexions à propos de la saga du
conflit des lois, in LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ: ESPRIT ET METHODES, MÉ-
LANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE PAUL LAGARDE 343 (2007).
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In the American realist school in Conflict of Laws, Currie explicitly
discouraged judgment by simply postulating that if the forum has any inter-
est in the dispute it should apply its own law, and arguing that no other
factors but state interests should enter the analysis.200 Different reasons were
offered for narrowing the analysis to state interests only and for giving pref-
erence to the forum’s interest in a case of a true conflict. In a letter to fellow
realist David Cavers, Currie argued that the analysis in Conflict of Laws had
to be narrowed to state interests in order to provide “a method of general
utility”201 and to discourage “judicial discretion.”202 Furthermore, even
within the framework of state interests, he argued courts could not engage
in the process of weighing state interests, for political considerations, as well
as because of limitations of judgment.203 How could a court ever find that
its state has an interest in the legal matter and yet conclude that a foreign
state has an even higher interest? More generally, how could a national court
ever conclude that the law of another state is more enlightened, more just,
or more efficient?204
Furthermore, Conflict of Laws theories that propose applying a blend
of the laws in conflict have either been immediately refuted or simply disre-
garded, as they presumably overcomplicate rather than simplify the choice
of law question and judicial determinations in transnational cases.205
200. See supra Section I.A (discussing Currie’s theory).
201. A Correspondence, supra note 48, at 487.
202. Id. at 490–91 (“I have never been entirely comfortable with the idea that conflict
problems should be resolved through the exercise of a freedom which the court does
not enjoy in a domestic case, however.”).
203. See Economics of Law, supra note 22, at 85 (noting “the manipulability of the concept
[of state interest] which enables one to always find some interest of the forum and
which “has plagued scholars of governmental interests since the theory’s inception”).
204. See id. at 89 (discussing how this question is also posed, and left unanswered, in
current economic theories of Conflict of Laws). For an argument that interest analy-
sis struggles with such questions and ways of judging when to defer to the policy of
other states, see McDougal, supra note 197. For the idea that judges could not assess
the better law in terms of justice and reasonability, see WHINCOP & KEYES, supra
note 56; Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883,
893 (2002).
205. Josephus Jitta’s version of a relational methodology for Conflict of Laws at the end of
the nineteenth century was disavowed in Europe for its implicit complexity, lack of
predictability, and an open acknowledgment that different national courts might
reach different results on the contentious maters involved in Conflict of Laws dis-
putes because of deep disagreements about core values. See the academic exchange
over three Articles, about the complexity and unpredictability of Jitta’s method for
Conflict of Laws. See generally JOSEPHUS JITTA, DAS WESEN DES INTERNATIONALEN
PRIVATRECHTS (1899); LUDWIG VON BAR, NEUE PRINZIPIEN UND METHODEN DES
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS  (1899); JOSEPHUS JITTA, ALTE UND NEUE
METHODEN DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS (1900).
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The implicit assumption—which was never adequately theorized—
that judges would not be able to “judge” between competing substantive
norms pertaining to different communities broke Conflict of Laws in two
ideological camps—the particularists versus the universalists. Both particu-
larists and universalists shared the intuition that judges would inevitably opt
for their own law when determining which law is preferable in substantive
terms generated various responses. Therefore, universalists advocated for the
creation of universal neutral rules; some particularists simply conceded that
each court would apply its law whenever it has jurisdiction. Recently, Jacco
Bomhoff suggested that current projects to reform Conflict of Laws should
focus on encouraging each court to assess the merits of applying a particular
law, while avoiding the overly parochial tendencies that are associated with
it.206
Engaging with feminist relational theories on judgment would bring a
tremendous contribution to such reform projects. In what follows, I merely
want to offer a few dimensions of such contribution generally, before show-
ing how it might impact the Conflict of Laws analysis of transnational sur-
rogacy arrangements.
First, relational feminism would allow Conflict of Laws to continue its
commitment to a formal principle of equality and equal moral worth, espe-
cially since transnational matters involve individuals of different nationali-
ties. But as Robin West and Jennifer Nedelsky both point out, equal moral
worth is a benchmark that should underlie notions of the rule of law and
equality, not a substitute for contextual and relational perspectives.207
Proper equality and respect for difference can only be granted through the
relational methodology. Therefore, while individuals’ equal moral worth
and the equal worth of legal systems should be maintained, they should not
prevent decision makers in Conflict of Laws from engaging with context
and particularities.
Second, Nedelsky’s theory of community-based judgment demon-
strates that it is neither inevitable that one chooses one’s community, nor
that one will opt for the foreign community because of its location. The
possibility that a judge could decide that in the factual circumstances of the
dispute, as well as given the social-political transnational context in which it
arose, the application of a foreign law is preferable to the application of
forum law is left entirely open. Conversely, a court hearing a Conflict of
Laws dispute might properly reject the application of foreign law when exer-
206. See Bomhoff, supra note 15, at 263.
207. See generally NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS, supra note 25, at 161–62; NEDELSKY,
RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE, supra note 76.
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cising proper judgment (not merely because of the court’s membership in
the national community).
Third, a community-based perspective on judging in Conflict of Laws
would challenge the assumption, central to Currie’s theory, that judges’
community of reference in Conflict of Laws can only be the national one.
The links of the dispute and of the parties to different communities should
inform judges’ responsibility to consult and critically engage with the per-
spectives of all communities involved (and not only the national ones). This
should also increase the level of empathy that judges offer litigants situated
in different communities with different standpoints.
Fourth, judges must acknowledge the need to justify their claims of
validity across various communities, precisely because they must appreciate
the diversity of views of different communities implicated in Conflict of
Laws matters. This means that creating links, cross-references, and even a
blend between the different laws implicated may be preferable, and some-
times inevitable.
Lastly, relational feminist insights reveal that, despite the extensive ge-
ographical implications of Conflict of Laws matters, there is no standpoint
of humanity from which to judge them. This confirms, and better explains,
the reality that Conflict of Laws determinations among national courts may
vary, and often do. Yet relational analysis and community-based judgment
would discourage the lamenting that frequently accompanies such situations
in Conflict of Laws. Given the complexity of Conflict of Laws matters, and
of the transnational realm in which they occur, and their simultaneous em-
beddedness in different communities, a thorough relational analysis may
generate different judgments and therefore expose contested values. But ex-
posing contested values also better illuminates what is at stake and how
different national courts and national communities perceive those stakes. If
each national court’s Conflict of Laws determination becomes a standpoint
on how to structure the particular relationship in dispute in the transna-
tional realm, given the communities it touches, Conflict of Laws would
have much to gain in transparency and democratic deliberation. If courts
and legislators explicitly appeal to the application of the law of the place of
tort or the law of the corporations’ headquarters as a means of structuring
tort relationships in particular ways by reference to particular values, we
could debate on the soundness of that pattern of relationships, or debate
around the values referenced. Similarly, if courts and legislators justify the
application of the law of the surrogate mother’s or the intended parents’
domicile as a way of structuring a particular kind of relationship among
them based on clearly stated values, one can better appreciate and debate
what is really at stake in these Conflict of Laws cases.
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Conflict of Laws issues are precisely about clashes of policy and values
in different communities. Relational feminist theories of judging, which try
to capture the inter-community and cross-community nature of judging, are
particularly valuable for Conflict of Laws. But Conflict of Laws scenarios do
not only feature clashes of policy and values between different national
communities. They increasingly show clashes between alleged “universal”
values underlying human rights norms and national policy. Transnational
tort matters involving multinational corporations, such as the Bhopal disas-
ter, are increasingly perceived as a clash between multinational corporations’
preference to conduct their business in accordance with a low standard of
care and the rights and interests of indigenous populations.208 Similarly,
transnational surrogacy arrangements often place the national policy of dis-
avowing transnational surrogacy arrangements in tension with human rights
norms protecting children and family life.209
Relational feminism complicates the appeal to public policy of the
state asked to recognize a surrogacy arrangement entered elsewhere, al-
though such arrangement is prohibited under domestic law. Through a rela-
tional feminist lens, Richard Storrow has argued that countries outlawing
surrogacy agreements are complicit in creating a market for them elsewhere,
in less developed countries:
Local laws that purport to outlaw socially irresponsible forms of
procreation have extraterritorial effects that violate the spirit of
those same laws. By importing oppression in the form of infertile
individuals to travel abroad to exercise what they perceive to be
the reproductive rights in the destination countries in ways that
oppress women there, these laws turn public oppression in one
country into private oppression in another.210
In light of the interconnection between laws in different countries, appeals
to national public policy can only be made with an eye to the impact such
policy has elsewhere.
It is in the realm of appreciating how to judge between national and
international public policy that Conflict of Laws struggles most in current
208. See e.g., UPENDRA BAXI, INCONVENIENT FORUM AND CONVENIENT CATASTROPHE:
THE BHOPAL CASE (N.M. Tripathi ed., 1986); UPENDRA BAXI & THOMAS PAUL,
MASS DISASTERS AND MULTINATIONAL LIABILITY: THE BHOPAL CASE (N.M.
Tripathi ed., 1986).
209. See e.g., Yasmine Ergas, Thinking ‘Through’ Human Rights: The Need for a Human
Rights Perspective With Respect to the Regulation of Cross-border Reproductive Surrogacy,
in INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS: LEGAL REGULATION AT THE IN-
TERNATIONAL LEVEL 427 (Katarina Trimmings & Paul Beaumont eds., 2013).
210. Storrow, supra note 156, at 329.
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times. Horatia Muir Watt, for example, argues that ways of incorporating
human rights and human rights reasoning are excluded from classical Con-
flict of Laws theories and that the field has virtually no internal resources to
problematize the impact of human rights norms on its analytics and meth-
odology.211 But as Jennifer Nedelsky has argued, “the debates over “univer-
sal” human rights versus alleged abuses defended in the name of culture and
tradition are best understood as conflicts between different communities of
judgment.”212
Recently, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) reviewed
various judgments issued in transnational surrogacy cases by different Euro-
pean courts for their compliance with human rights norms.213 In one of
these cases, the ECtHR rejected the French government and French courts’
argument that France could not recognize a transnational surrogacy arrange-
ment because of its national public policy. Instead, the court argued that it
could “not accept the public policy mechanism as such” and that, although
typical of Conflict of Laws reasoning, its application must still ensure a
proper balance between the interests and values of the French national com-
munity expressed in its public policy and the interests of the child “to the
full enjoyment of her rights to the respect of her family and private life.”214
The court thereby committed Conflict of Laws to a process of judging
across “communities of judgment”—considering the national French com-
munity and the larger (in this case primarily European) community com-
mitted to human rights norms, of which France is certainly a part—and
used proportionality and the margin of appreciation criteria to balance the
rights and interests involved in this clash of policies.215 Where traditional
Conflict of Laws allows the application of national public policy when the
state has sufficient contact with the dispute, the ECtHR posited a judgment
in between and across communities of judgment as the proper method of
analysis.
Muir Watt argued that precisely because human rights methodologies
seem to offer this fluid and substantive analytical process, it should take over
Conflict of Laws reasoning and methodology, such that we may be speaking
211. Muir Watt supra note 11, at 348-50.
212. Nedelsky, Communities of Judgment, supra note 185, at 249.
213. See, e.g., Paradiso & Campanelli v. Italy, App. No. 2538/12, Judgment (ECtHR,
Jan. 27, 2015) (this decision is not final as it was resent to the Grand Chamber in
June 2015); Hennesson v. France, App. No. 65192/11, Judgment (ECtHR, June 26,
2014); Labassee v. France, App. No. 65941/11, Judgment (ECtHR, June 26, 2014).
214. Labassee v. France, App. No. 65941/11, at para. 63.
215. See Ivana Isailovic, The ECtHR and the Regulation of Transnational Security Arrange-
ments, EJIL: TALK! (July 25, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-ecthr-and-the-regu-
lation-of-transnational-surrogacy-agreements/ (reviewing recent ECtHR decisions
regarding transnational surrogacy).
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of “the end of Choice of Law.”216 Yet relational feminist theories of judging
show that this does not need to be a specifically human rights methodology;
rather, it should underlie every legal determination involving different com-
munities of judgment—precisely the bread and butter of Conflict of Laws.
And to the extent that Conflict of Laws fails to engage with human rights
arguments because they do not fit within the field’s paradigm of clashes
between national communities, relational feminist theories will illuminate
that human rights norms themselves form a community of judgment.
By expanding the standpoints which courts hearing Conflict of Laws
matters need to consider in their “enlarged mentality”217 to human rights
norms, relational feminism expands the range of communities of judgment
that are implicated in many current transnational issues, including surro-
gacy arrangements. This in turn exposes a much wider set of interests and
values involved in such matters, including the autonomy, health, and well-
being of surrogate mothers, and of children born as a result of these
arrangements.
From a relational feminist perspective, an instrument of cross-border
cooperation which mirrors in some respects the Hague Convention on
Cross-Border Adoptions, as was recently proposed by Katarina Trimmings
and Paul Beaumont,218 might be the proper way of dealing with cross-bor-
der surrogacy arrangements, at least for the time being.219
CONCLUSIONS
Although feminists have thus far never turned their attention to Con-
flict of Laws, the field cries out for feminist critiques and reconstructions.
As in many other legal fields and jurisprudential categories, Conflict of
Laws could be entirely re-envisioned through a feminist or, as I have argued
here, a relational feminist, lens. Conflict of Laws oscillates between state-
216. Muir Watt, supra note 11, at 363–82.
217. Nedelsky, Communities of Judgment, supra note 185, at 259.
218. See Trimmings & Beaumont, General Report, supra note 128, at 442. Some of the
conditions and protections the authors proposed would be carried through from the
adoption convention include: a pre-approval procedure, pre-screening of both in-
tended parents and surrogate mother, automatic recognition of surrogacy arrange-
ments entered into in accordance with the terms of the convention, constructing an
exclusive network of national central authorities and assignment of various responsi-
bilities to central authorities in sending and receiving countries, and providing for a
period in which the surrogate mother can revisit her decision after birth.
219. Many countries that formerly accepted international surrogacy arrangements have
declared or are in the process of declaring them illegal. See Donna Dickenson, The
End of Cross-Border Surrogacy, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www
.project-syndicate.org/commentary/crackdown-on-international-surrogacy-trade-by-
donna-dickenson-2016-02.
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centric and individualistic perspectives and struggles to conceptualize its
regulatory dimensions by reference to individual autonomy, consent, and
choice or by reference to state sovereignty, state authority, and state
interests.
Relational feminism, as I have argued, would center Conflict of Laws
analysis on a social, relational image of the individual in her transnational
existence and would hold Conflict of Laws accountable to the patterns of
relationships it structures among different individuals and communities in
the transnational realm. Understanding autonomy as relational would reveal
the fact that Conflict of Laws does not suffer from offering too much auton-
omy to individuals, but from falsely conceptualizing autonomy as free
choice and consent, rather than as a capacity forged in relation to and
through valuable relationships with others. Through a relational feminist
lens, Conflict of Laws would perceive individuals’ claims for the application
of one law or another as pleas for the recognition, reconstruction, or tran-
scending of various relationships in which they are embedded. It would
adopt and embrace its role in fostering valuable relationships through which
individuals can be given a voice and a space to articulate their interests and
concerns. Furthermore, by taking a relational approach to judging, decision
makers in Conflict of Laws would take an active role in appreciating the
needs and interests of all actors and communities implicated in or affected
by the transnational legal matters. Conflict of Laws would maintain its
commitment to equality between legal systems and between nationals and
foreigners, but would no longer use these principles as an excuse for not
focusing on a rich contextual analysis of the way in which individuals and
their private law relationships are embedded in a wide network of relation-
ships in the transnational realm.
The contributions of relational feminism to Conflict of Laws could
certainly go beyond those articulated here. In this Article, I argued that a
relational feminist approach would reframe the tension Conflict of Laws
often creates between public policy and autonomy and between national
and international public policy. Furthermore, it would frame both the
choice of “connecting factors” and the “characterization” of transnational
legal matters according to the patterns of relationships they create in the
transnational realm. All of these aspects, I argued, are pressing in Conflict of
Laws’ struggle to analyze international surrogacy arrangements.
But relational feminism’s relevance for Conflict of Laws is not limited
to family law matters and/or to matters involving women. In the remaining
paragraphs of these conclusions, I merely want to sketch relational femi-
nism’s potential contributions to Conflict of Laws matters outside the realm
of family law and identity issues.
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For example, transnational tort matters do not seem to implicate such
strong personal relationships, difficult decisions, and emotional suffering as
surrogacy matters. Furthermore, transnational torts committed by transna-
tional corporations in the course of their mining operation are often
thought of as economic and trade issues for which a relational feminist anal-
ysis might seem less intuitive. Yet a relational feminist approach would im-
pact the analysis of these issues in Conflict of Laws as well.
The part of the Conflict of Laws analysis called choice of law aims to
discern whether we should apply the law of the tort of the corporation’s
headquarters (usually a highly-developed state) or the tort law of the place
where the mining operation was conducted. The need for a choice arises
from the fact that both the standard of care and the damage quantum un-
derlying the law of the place of tort are often lower than the standard of care
and the damage quantum underlying tort laws of the state of incorporation.
I have already noted that this choice of law question is usually framed in
one of two ways. The first is to see this as a question of implied choice,
autonomy, or vested rights according to which one would ask whether the
parties implicitly consented to the application of the law of the tort because
it is common to both, or whether the correlative rights and duties of the
parties vested at this location because this is where the act and damage oc-
curred. Another would be to frame this as a question of conflicts of state
interest, according to which one would ask whether the state of incorpora-
tion would have an interest in imposing a higher liability on its corporations
abroad.
A feminist relational analysis would prevent such formalist assump-
tions. It would instead expose the entire complexity of the conflict of inter-
est between the litigating parties. More importantly, it would hold Conflict
of Laws accountable to the kind of relationships it structures, such that it
would become immediately apparent that applying the law of the place of
the tort would place multinational corporations in a position of increased
power in relationship to the communities in which their mining operations
are centered.
Many relational feminist insights offered for domestic tort law would
also be useful in the analysis of transnational tort matters. For example,
Leslie Bender, who has provided extensive relational feminist accounts re-
examining the “no duty to rescue” and the “reasonable man/person” doc-
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trines,220 as well mass or toxic torts,221 argues that our standard in tort law
should not be “reason, or even caution, but care.”222
Furthermore, Bender argues that a relational feminist lens allows us to
see that mass torts are often characterized, “[e]ven absent ill will and fraud,”
by increased “corporate violence” and unequal bargaining power evidenced
in:
[T]he complex organizations and hierarchical structures that dis-
tance decisionmakers from responsibilities for and connections
to the harms they generate; the pressures of mass production and
distribution systems; priorities of competitive profit-making over
human health and safety; the secrecy and lack of requirements
for public disclosure of risk-creation by corporations; and, in or-
ganizations with as many employees and as much force and
power as many nations, the absence of democratic processes and
accountability for decisions about nonconsensual risk-imposition
on different constituencies.223
Many of the elements listed by Bender are exacerbated in the transna-
tional context where the complex corporate structure extends over several
jurisdictions and where the local populations affected by their mining oper-
ations are often disenfranchised not only in relationship to the corporation,
but also in relationship to the foreign government, and often even to their
own government. In response to this, Bender argues not only that burdens
of proof would need to be reversed,224 but also that “courts are uniquely
positioned to assess the resources and information imbalances between liti-
gants in mass tort cases. Courts should, therefore, actively intervene to bal-
ance the relative power of the parties for purposes of the litigation.”225
Overall, Bender argues that what is needed from a relational feminist per-
220. Leslie Bender, Changing the Values of Tort Law, 25 TULSA L.J. 759 (1990); Leslie
Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEG. EDUC. 3 (1988).
221. Leslie Bender, Feminist Re(torts): Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power,
and Responsibility, 4 DUKE L.J. 848 (1990).
222. Leslie Bender, Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 575, 579
(1993) stating:
Even though the division between reason and care is a false construct, the reason/care
paradigm has been useful in feminist legal analysis to illustrate biases, hidden as-
sumptions, and male-centered norms within the legal system and to suggest re-con-
ceptualizations that make law more reflective of human experience and more
responsive to concerns of justice.
223. Id. at 581.
224. Id. at 582.
225. Id.
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spective is “[a] standard of legal responsibility that includes interpersonal
caregiving” which in turn would “mak[e] corporate decisionmakers person-
ally responsible for the consequences of their decisions, thus humanizing
corporations and their activities.”226
Peter Bell has also applied a feminist lens to contest neocontractual
theories of tort that focus on a hypothetical bargain between the litigating
parties.227 According to Bell, a neocontractual theory of tort fails to offer
care and respect to individuals,228 focuses too much on autonomy, and ref-
uses to account for the experiences and appeals to justice of the injured
victims.229 He posits that a relational and cooperative, rather than consen-
sual, relationship should underlie tort law230 and that tort law should focus
on socially valuable aspects, such as safety, trust, and availability of informa-
tion for consumers, etc.231
Virtually all these insights generated by a relational feminist perspec-
tive would prove useful for the Conflict of Laws analysis of transnational
torts of multinational corporations. Relational feminism allows us to see
that applying the lower standard of care and damage quantum would not
create a relationship between multinational corporations and the communi-
ties in which their mining operations are conducted that is characterized by
respect, mutual consideration, and actual care for each other’s interests and
well-being. Instead, it would create a double standard in which multina-
tional corporations would show a different level of care and consideration to
communities located in wealthier, more powerful states than in those with
increased poverty, corruption, or that are generally struggling to manage
their national resources.
Feminists should be aware of the way in which their methodological
and normative commitments are excluded from a field with a wide and
extremely important range of application for individuals’ transnational exis-
tence. Conflict of Laws scholars should be open to enlarging and revisiting
their methodological arsenal in light of feminist methodologies. Both Con-
flict of Laws and feminist scholars should engage in a fruitful dialogue about
ways in which Conflict of Laws could be reimagined and reconstructed in
light of feminist insights and critiques. As Ralf Michaels wrote, “choice of
law as a discipline indeed yearns for intellectual nurture”232 and feminism,
226. Id. at 583.
227. Peter A. Bell, Analyzing Tort Law: The Flawed Promise of Neocontract, 74 MINN. L.
REV. 1177, 1205–11 (1990).
228. Id. at 1179.
229. Id. at 1205–15.
230. Id. at 1207–10.
231. Id. at 1236–46.
232. Michaels. Economics of Law, supra note 22, at 75.
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especially relational feminism, could bring a great deal of such intellectual
nurture to Conflict of Laws.
